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Abstract 
 
Marriage in Iranian Cinema 
A Metaphorical Platform for the Discussion of Women’s Rights in Post-
Revolutionary Iran  
 
Caitlin Jane Sale, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Blake Atwood 
 
This thesis exams the use of marriage as a metaphorical platform in Iranian 
cinema for the discussion women’s rights issues outside of films classified as fīlmhā-ye 
zanān (‘women’s films). Drawing on theoretical frameworks of ‘consciousness raising’ 
and ‘cofabulation,’ analysis of these films focuses on the relationship between society 
and law as it is represented through marriage in film. Through a combination of content 
and contextual analysis, this thesis discusses the political, social and religious changes 
that took place in Iran between the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1941) and the presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) in order to establish the situation of women during 
these periods and women’s organization movements. In doing so, we can see that the 
discussion of women’s rights issues in Iran, although subdued in society, was able to 
emerge in film and break away from the generic boundaries of fīlmhā-ye zanān (women’s 
films) via the metaphorical platform of marriage into other film genres. By using 
 viii 
marriage as the site for discussion in film, representations of women’s rights in these 
films raised the consciousness of Iranian society and brought more open discussion of 
these issues to the public sphere. 
 ix 
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Introduction 
  
 The current Deputy Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs in Iran, Mahmoud 
Golzari, has claimed that 40,000 divorces occur every year, 1 adding to the already 
overwhelming number of singles in Iranian society. In the last seven years, the number of 
divorces occurring annually has increased by 1.1%, while the number of marriages 
occurring annually has decreased by 50%.2 These changing trends in divorce and 
marriage over recent years have exposed that Iranians may prioritize other affairs – 
continued education, for example – over marriage.  Without these marriages, the ideal of 
the nuclear family risks degradation, according to Iranian officials.3 Similar to other 
countries whose governments implement changes in the marriage system due to social 
problems, the Iranian government sees divorce as a crisis in Iranian society and actively 
                                                
1 “40,000 Divorcees Added to Iranian Society Every Year,” The Iran Project, accessed November 8, 2016, 
http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/01/05/40000-divorcees-added-to-iranian-society-every-year/. 
2 “Bohrān talāq dar Iran/Voqu’ 17 talāq dar har sā’at [The Divorce Crisis in Iran/17 Occurrences of 
Divorce Every Hour]” PersianPersia.com, Accessed March 17, 2016. 
http://www.persianpersia.com/social/sdetails.php?articleid=25673&parentid=132&catid=143. 
3 “Ayatollah Khamenei Promulgates Irans ‘Family’ Policies,” official website for the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; data collected by the Social Affairs office of the Interior Ministry and 
the Center of Women’s Participation in “Why Divorce? Let us Reform Ourselves,” in Mehr News; a 
statement from the former chair of Parliament, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel in “ Haddad-Adel: Cultural 
Issues Will Be My Second Priority,” in Mehr News; a statement from the Organization for Civil 
Registration, “Rate of Population Decrease in Iran is Faster than Other Countries,” and “Iran Experience 
Population Decline, Growing Old,” in Mehr News; “Iran May Establish Marriage and Divorce Ministry,” in 
Trend News Agency; “Proposed ‘Ministry of Marriage and Divorce’ Sparks Controversy,” in Almonitor: 
The Pulse of the Middle East. 
 2 
works to create solutions for what the Islamic Republic of Iran deems as a social ill.4 
Promoting marriage, specifically proper Islamic marriage, is key to solving this crisis. 
Not only has Iran participated in government supported mass marriage ceremonies,5 it 
has even launched a state-sponsored dating website in 2015, Find your Equal, to help 
connect single men and women in order to facilitate these marriages and avert this 
“family crisis.”6  
 The importance of marriage in Iran has been highlighted in history through 
Qur’anic verses, Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and Islamic clergy; through 
women’s organizations fighting for women’s equal rights in society who found shelter 
and solidarity in the High Council of Women (est. 1953) headed by Ashraf Pahlavi, twin 
sister to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran; and through pronouncements by 
religious leaders like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), founder of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Cinema also has played a role in marital discourse as a popular tool of 
state propaganda used by the Pahlavi Dynasty and Islamic Revolutionaries alike.7 But 
when you take away the state-sponsored ideology of marriage propaganda in film, what 
remains? Authors, such as Nasrin Rahimieh who has critically analyzed Iranian films that 
deal with the subjects of marriage and divorce, have argued that cultural representations, 
                                                
4 “Ayatollah Khamenei Promulgates Irans ‘Family’ Policies,” official website for the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “Haddad-Adel: Cultural Issues Will Be My Second Priority,” in Mehr 
News. 
5 “Iranian Regime Promotes Mass Marriage,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Accessed November 
8, 2016, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/iranian-regime-promotes-mass-marriage. 
6 “Iran Launches State-Sponsored Dating Site to Help its 11 Million Singletons get Married and Solve 
Country’s ‘Family Crisis,’” How Africa: The Rise of Africa, accessed November 8, 2016, 
http://howafrica.com/iran-launches-state-sponsored-dating-site-to-help-its-11million-singletons-get-
married-and-solve-countrys-family-crisis/. 
7 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Volumes 1-4, (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2012). 
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particularly cinematic representations, have created spaces for self-expression and 
resistance.8 Many authors have also suggested that the reformist policies of former 
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (1997– 2005) – especially with relation to his 
involvement in cinema reform even before his presidency – have been critical in allowing 
for more open discussion and critique of Iranian society.9 
 However, analyses such as these have relied heavily on content analysis to 
support their arguments and have excluded the context within in which these films have 
been created. This paper aims to fill this gap by placing Iranian films that explore 
matrimonial issues in the context of the current societal discourse in Iran around marriage 
in order to argue three things. First, while the reformist policies of Khatami have allowed 
more freedom in the overt discussion of marital issues in film, Iranian filmmakers have a 
long tradition of placing marriage and marital issues at the centers of their films, albeit 
more subtly in some instances. Second, the representation of marriage and divorce issues 
in Post-Revolutionary Iranian film represents continued conversation of marital issues 
amongst Islamic clergy, the Iranian government, and the citizens of Iran that can be 
traced to women’s movements that began in the Pahlavi Era. And third, marriage and 
                                                
8 Nasrin Rahimieh, “Divorce Seen Through Women’s Cinematic Lens,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 42.1 (2009): 
97–112; Iclal Cetin, “Middle Eastern Women Filmmakers of This Century,” Review of Middle East Studies, 
Vol. 44.1 (2010): 54–59; Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics in the Cinemas of 
Hollywood and the Arab World (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2006); Hanna Adoni and Sherrill 
Mane, “Media and the Social Construct of Reality: Toward an Integration of Theory and Research,” 
Communication Research, Vol. 11.3 (1984): 323–340;  
9 Minoo Derayeh, “Depiction of Women in Iranian Cinema, 1970s to Present,” Women’s Studies 
International Forum Vol. 33 (2010): 151–158;  Sayeed Zedabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema: 
Film and Society in the Islamic Republic; Blake Atwood, Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political 
Change in the Islamic Republic; Shahab Esfandiary, Iranian Cinema & Globalization. 
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divorce manifest in Iranian cinema due in combination to their deeply embedded roots in 
Iranian society and the often political nature of Iranian cinema. 
 Since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, marriage has been a central concern for 
those who practice the Islamic faith. According to the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet 
Muhammad, there are few things more important for Muslims than marriage – for all 
single men and women, including those who have been divorced. The benefits of 
marriage are twofold: marriage not only comprises part of a Muslims religious duty, it 
also serves to remove temptation in the form of illicit sexual relationships that may occur 
in the absence of a permanent spouse.  
 For Muslims, marriage is governed by religious precepts set down by the Prophet 
that have been absorbed into the modern practice of Islamic law which has two 
components: the sacred and the temporal. Islamic law is sacred in the sense that it is 
divinely inspired and thus absolute and unchallengeable. Yet in the approximately 1,400 
years since the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the laws governing marriage have 
gained a distinct temporal aspect in that they are now a product of centuries of Islamic 
jurisprudential interpretations which have led to a wide and well-developed body of legal 
theory. In practice:  
 
Each disputed case is [. . .] a microcosm of forces that shape the reality of 
Muslim life: the force of the sacred element in law; the modern legal 
system that embodies and enforces it; and the way that individuals, be they 
judges or litigants, perceive and relate to both.10 
 
                                                
10 Ziba Mir-Hossieni, Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family law, Iran and Morocco Compared, 
(London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1993), 1-2.  
 5 
In other words, progression of society will necessarily elicit unprecedented cases that 
require a re-interpretation of Islamic law (temporal) in order to follow the ideal of Islamic 
law (sacred) through a process of individual reasoning in accordance with Islam, called 
itjihad.11 
  Afsaneh Najmabadi, for example, shows how the discourse around distinguishing 
between “the (acceptable)trans and the (deviant)homosexual”12 that emerged in Iran 
between the 1940s and 1970s enabled the government to define marriage as 
heteronormative by sanctioning gender reassignment surgeries for those we were deemed 
truly transsexual individuals.13 In this instance, sex reassignment surgery was seen a legal 
solution to keep marriages and relationships between a man and a woman, as the Qur’an 
defines it. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), founder of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, also sanctioned sex reassignment surgery in 1964 as permissible in Islam. 
According to many scholars, this same process of itjihad is most widespread in family 
law where the prevalence of divine revelations has blurred the lines between the sacred 
and temporal.14 Scholars such as Ziba Mir-Hosseni, Azar Tabari, Nahid Yeganeh, Fatima 
Mernissi, and Janet Afary, among others, have looked particularly at the how situation of 
women has been impacted through the evolution of these family laws, specifically with 
                                                
11 Itjihad is an Islamic legal term that refers to a jurist’s use of reasoning in finding a religious solution to a 
legal problem, and is only used when Qur’anic verses and Sunnah are ambiguous on the issue. 
12 Afsaneh Najmabadi, Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary 
Iran,(London and Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 4. 
13 More information about the process of determining “true” transsexuality can be found in Afsaneh 
Najmabadi’s book, Professing Selves. 
14 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial. 
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regards to marriage, divorce and child custody laws.15 Like a mirror, cinema has often 
reflected cultural and social issues such as these. In Iran, cinema is particularly helpful in 
showing societal attitudes towards marriage and divorce, a theme that can be seen in 
many Iranian films. The award-winning film Jodāi-ye Nāder az Sīmīn / A Separation 
powerfully brought the centrality of marriage and divorce in Iranian cinema to 
international attention in 2011. 
 Directed by Asghar Farhadi and starring Leila Hatami (Sīmīn) and Peyman Maadi 
(Nāder), A Separation follows a brief time in the lives of a married Iranian couple that 
struggles through the conflicts of familial responsibilities, love and sacrifice. Sīmīn 
wishes to leave Iran and live abroad in order to create a better life for their young 
daughter; however, Nāder refuses to leave because of his ailing father, for whom he 
cares. Despite the responsibility Nāder feels towards his father who suffers from 
Alzheimer’s, Sīmīn believes that he is prioritizing his responsibility as a son over his 
responsibility as a husband and a father and sues for a divorce, in part to be able to leave 
Iran. Several events occur that further challenge the strength of this family and they 
ultimately separate leaving some room for audience imagination in the final scene. 
 International reception of this film was overwhelming. A Separation became the 
first Iranian film to receive an Academy Award for best foreign film in 2012, as well as 
winning the award for Best Foreign Language Film at the Golden Globe Awards.  In 
2011, it received a Golden Bear for Best Film at the 61st Berlin International Film 
                                                
15 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage On Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law, Iran and Morocco Compared; 
Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh, In the Shadow of Islam: The Women’s Movement in Iran; Fatima 
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society: Janet Afary, Sexual 
Politics in Modern Iran 
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Festival, where Leila Hatami and Peyman Maadi also won Silver Bears for Best Actress 
and Best Actor, respectively.16 At the Fajr International Film Festival in 2011, A 
Separation won six Crystal Simorghs, including Best Director, Best Cinematography and 
Best Screenplay, in addition to the Audience Award for Best Film. A Separation was also 
nominated for an Academy Award for the Best Original Screenplay, the first foreign 
language film to be nominated for this award in five years. By 2012, A Separation had 
grossed over 12 million dollars internationally, domestic ticket sales in Iran accounting 
for over half of that total, at seven million.17 
 National and international critics alike hailed A Separation as a “gripping moral 
and social drama,”18 “tense and narratively complex, formally dense and morally 
challenging,”19 and praised it for its actors who had an “unusual depth of 
characterization.”20 Lee Marshal of Screen Daily wrote that  “Farhadi has hit upon a story 
that is not only about men and women, children and parents, justice and religion in 
today's Iran, but that raises complex and globally relevant questions of responsibility.”21  
In Iran, the journal Fīlm has published over 19 articles and dossiers about A Separation in 
just less than two years. Film publications continue to praise A Separation continues as 
                                                
16 Silver Bears for Best Actress and Actor were also given to several of the other male and female actors: 
Sareh Bayat, Sarina Farhadi and Kimia Hosseini (Best Actress); Shahab Hosseini, Ali-Asghar Shahbazi and 
Babak Karimi (Best Actor). 
17 “A Separation (2011),” Box Office Mojo. 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=intl&id=aseperation.htm, accessed February 24, 2016. 
18 “Nadar and Simin – A Separation,” Screen Daily, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://www.screendaily.com/reviews/latest-reviews/nader-and-simin-a-separation/5023837.article. 
19 “Review: ‘Nader and Simin, A Separation,’” Variety, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://variety.com/2011/film/markets-festivals/nader-and-simin-a-separation-1117944617/. 
20 “A Separation: Film Review,” The Hollywood Reporter, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/a-separation-film-review-99930. 
21 Lee Marshall, “Nadar and Simin – A Separation,” Screen Daily, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://www.screendaily.com/reviews/latest-reviews/nader-and-simin-a-separation/5023837.article. 
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one of the most far-reaching and impactful films in the history of Iranian film due in part 
to its international reception.  
 Out of so many Iranian films to be shown internationally over the last several 
decades, why was this particular film so successful? Was it the dissolution of marriage 
that was so relatable across cultures? The moral questions raised that challenged 
audiences for an answer?  Or was it the idea of a movie like this, one that raises moral 
issues whose solutions are not necessary Islamic and whose message is not inherently 
political, coming out of Iran – a country widely perceived as enforcing strict censorship 
regulations on film – that made it so successful?  
 Some scholars have speculated that the changing politics surrounding film 
censorship during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) paved the way for 
issues such as these to be brought to light for the first time since the relative creative 
freedom during the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925– 1978).22 While it is true that Khatami’s 
reforms to the Iranian film industry did lessen some restrictions on acceptable content 
allowing for more overt critique of Iranian society, looking at the history of Iranian 
cinema, one can see that the preoccupation with marriage in Iranian film is not a new 
phenomenon. Although issues change along with politics, economics and society, 
directors have often firmly planted marriage and divorce at the center of many Iranian 
films.  
  
                                                
22 Minoo Derayeh, “Depiction of Women in Iranian Cinema, 1970s to Present,” Women’s Studies 
International Forum Vol. 33 (2010): 151–158; Sayeed Zedabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema: 
Film and Society in the Islamic Republic; Blake Atwood, Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political 
Change in the Islamic Republic; Shahab Esfandiary, Iranian Cinema & Globalization. 
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Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
  
 In contrast to the idea that cinema production operates as a top-bottom system,23 
Iranian cinema can be characterized by audience participation in the creation of film 
content due in part to Iranian literary traditions as well as the evolution of the film 
industry in Iran. Hamid Naficy, author of a four-volume book series titled A Social 
History of Iranian Cinema, states that like literature, cinema has a long tradition in 
Iranian history yet it errs more on the political side rather than philosophical, as it has 
long been used as a medium to convey modernity, both metaphorically and in actuality.24 
He attributes this emergence of modernity largely to two formations, the “Iranian state” 
and the “Hollywood cinema machine,”25 which tended to act hegemonically, together 
setting the terms of the struggle to convey this modernity. These two formations were not 
the only factors in this discursive project, but were joined by Iranian society through 
active consumption of these ‘hegemonic’ messages conveyed through film.   
 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad uses the term “cofabulation” to describe the role of the 
audience in making meanings of narrative.26 Rather than passively receiving a narrative, 
cofabulation is the process by which the narrative invokes active audience participation in 
                                                
23 Douglas Gomery, “Hollywood as Industry,” in Hollywood Studio System: A History (London: British 
Film Institute, 2005), 19–28; Thoedor Adorno and Max Horkeimer. “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment 
as Mass Deception,” in Media and Culture Studies, Eds. Meenaskshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2001), 94–136. 
24 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Volume 1: The Artisanal Era, 1897–1941 (Duke: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 1. 
25 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Volume 1, 2. 
26 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad,  “Introduction” in The Politics of Iranian Cinema: Film and Society in the 
Islamic Republic (NewYork: Routledge, 2010), 11. 
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negotiating meaning and invites them to agree, disagree or change any of the parts 
presented. Zeydabadi-Nejad discusses how Iranian audiences are particularly active in 
this cofabulation process when it comes to political messages in social films.27 Aware of 
the censorship guidelines that pertain to cinema, Iranians are extra-vigilant when viewing 
social films and are predisposed to consider them as political, thus leading them to 
attempt to ascertain which aspects of the film may have been censored.28 In doing so, 
Iranian audiences also ‘edit’ these films for themselves, rejecting some parts and 
reinterpreting others. In addition to audience participation, Naficy also uses the stew-pot, 
tough-guy and war film genres in Iranian cinema to show that individual filmmakers and 
the film industry have been able to create moments of partial hegemony above and 
beyond these two formations. In these ways, “Iranians resisted, rejected, accommodated, 
and selectively adapted and celebrated modernity and its features” actively rather than 
projects imposing it on them from the outside29 and examining audience participation in 
meaning making can be key to understanding how modern cultures are formed.   
  Mark Duez, in his article “Media Industries,” argues that “contemporary citizen-
consumers [. . .] demand the right to participate – to be an part of the production, 
circulation, and interpretation of their culture and to exert a shaping role over the content 
of the popular culture”30 that is part of their lives. In addition to this desire of citizen-
consumers to participate in content production, audience plays a more important role in 
                                                
27 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema, 1–29. 
28 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema, 1–29. 
29 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Volume 1, 2. 
30 Mark Duez, Media Industries, 150. 
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shaping content – contrary to what many producers wish to believe. In the case of Iranian 
cinema, the commercial film industry thrived despite harsh criticism by film critics who 
claimed that social films – especially fīlmfarsi movies – were technically inferior to films 
from other world cinemas, among other reasons. Yet despite this, these movies thrived in 
Iranian society due to their popularity in a predominantly middle class, male audience.31 
Many film producers often used an “imagined audience” in creating television shows and 
films in order to justify, and indeed predict the success of, proposed films.32 In order to 
analyze these “imagined audiences” and to fully understand the ways in which audiences 
interpret film, it is critical to understand their political context.  The impact of liminality 
in Iran due to social change has had great impact on the cofabulation process of Iranian 
audiences. 
 Zeydabadi-Nejad borrows the term “liminality” from Victor Turner’s Liminality 
and the Performance of Genre and applies it to the Iranian context to describe the times 
of destabilization that occur from rapid social change, such as the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. Such moments cause Iranians to find themselves between what is and what will 
be.33  In these phases, opportunities arise to step back and reflect on everyday routines 
from a detached position with these reflections often taking shape in cultural 
performances, such as film. These films then, according to Zeydabadi-Nejad act as 
                                                
31 Hamid Naficy, “Commercial Cinema’s Evolution: From Artisinal Mode to Hybrid Production,” 147– 
196. 
32 John Thornton Caldwell, Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and 
Television (Duke: Duke University Press, 2009), 223. 
33 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema, 1–29. 
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“metacommentary”34 of social contexts – such as wars, revolutions, institutional changes 
– and that this metacommentary can be “implicit or explicit, witting or unwitting.”35 In 
combination with cofabulation, Iranian cinema presents a symbiotic relationship between 
viewer and producer that is much like a game of hide and seek, with viewers trying to 
find where the government has influenced aspects if representation and content. With 
these frameworks in mind, we can begin to analyze the role that marriage has played in 
the discussion of women’s rights in Post-Revolutionary Iran through its presentation in 
film.  
  In order discuss the function that marriage plays in Iranian cinema, I will use the 
first chapter to discuss cinema in Iran during the Qajar and Pahlavi Dynasties in order to 
show its continued political nature pre- and post-Revolution. Next, I will discuss the 
political and economic situation of Iran leading up to the Revolution paying special 
attention to the status of women’s rights and the advancements of these rights by 
women’s movements that found traction in the political landscape of the Pahlavi 
Dynasty. Discussion of these movements in necessary in order to show how these issues 
transgressed from social activity to discussion in film. Important to this analysis 
embedded nature of marriage in Iranian society due to its role in Islam and how marriage 
is used to socially construct many aspects of society through its inclusion in films during 
the reign of the Pahlavis.  
                                                
34 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema, 12. 
35 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema, 12. 
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 Chapter two will then draw upon two films, Hāmoun (Dariush Mehrju’i, 
1990) and Āsheghāneh/Romantic, (Dir. Ali-Reza Davoudnejad, 1995), that 
exemplify several of the current issues in Iranian society, namely divorce and 
social status. In order to connect these films to women’s issues, this chapter 
will include the Iranian periodical Fīlm that will show how these films were 
discussed by film critics and society in a publication that is not inherently 
political like other periodicals in Iran such as Zanān that have a distinctly 
feminist tone. In addition, the production context surrounding these films, such 
as censorship laws, will be a critical part of this chapter, as it will show why 
marriage was able to facilitate the discussion of women’s issues after women’s 
movements halted after the Revolution. 
 Finally, chapter three will look at a new political context after the 
Revolution when Mohammad Khatami was president of Iran from 1997 to 
2005 and will discuss the cinematic and political reforms that took place under 
his leadership. Two films from this period, Leilā (Dir. Dariush Mehrju’i, 1997) 
and Ātash bas/Ceasefire (Dir. Tahmineh Milani, 2006), will show how discussion 
of societal issues in film are more overt due in part to the reforms that Khatami 
implemented. This will be particularly apparently in the analysis between Leilā 
and Hāmoun, as Dariush Mehrju’i directs them both. This chapter will also 
include information from Fīlm in order to connect these films to discussions in 
society. 
 14 
 The films selected for this thesis act as evidence of how women’s 
issues break generic conventions and can be found in many Iranian films not 
included in the genre fīlmhā-ye zanān. Discussion of the plots of these films will 
serve to show how frequently Iranian law with regards to marriage is used to not 
only discuss the legalistic side of women’s issues, but also the emotional and 
social impacts as well. In transforming for entertainment to consciousness-raising, 
articles from Fīlm, a non-political Iranian Journal, will highlight the political 
nature that many articles took when discussing aspects of these films showing that 
women’s issues in this film are recognizable and resonate with Iranian society. In 
doing so, these films constitute a sort of subconscious activist films that highlight 
the inequality women face in Iranian society. 
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Chapter 1: Cinema, Marriage and Women’s Rights 1900–1978 
 While Jodāi-ye Nāder az Sīmīn/A Separation may have brought international 
attention to the subjects of divorce and marriage in Iran, it is by no means the only 
Iranian film that deals with this subject and Iran is not the only country to use these 
themes in film. So why is the use of marriage and divorce as theme in Iranian films worth 
study? Why do Iranian films often center on marriage and divorce, and how do they use 
these themes to discuss social issues? How do these films bring awareness of these issues 
to the public? Why do they perpetuate women’s rights discourse in Iran?  Iranian cinema 
remains intertwined with politics since its first use in Iran until the present day as 
different political regimes have used cinema to promote new ways of thinking about 
nationality and national values, and film producers have often used film to push back on 
these ideals and critique Iranian society. Because of this, Iranian cinema acts as an 
important window into different political and cultural contexts throughout Iranian history. 
 Scholars such as Amy Motlagh have analyzed the role that marriage has played in 
shaping modernity in Iran. In Burying the Beloved: Marriage, Realism, and Reform in 
Modern Iran, she argues that marriage is not only a metaphor for social and legal 
reforms, but the actual site in which these reforms take shape. Motlagh’s analysis focus 
on Iranian literature and discusses how the Pahlavi’s modernization dismembered the 
idea of ambiguous love seen in classical poetry in order to fit into “a vision of 
heterosexual love and heterosocial public sphere.”36 Dismemberment of ambiguous love 
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and the metaphor of marriage were oppositional and yet complimentary key structuring 
features through which the Pahlavi’s legal and political instruments, primarily the Iranian 
Civil Code (ICC), allowed modernity to transcend the past.37 Motlagh writes:  
The celebration of marriage and the ideal of the companionate wife in 
legal discourse and in fiction depend on the burial of this ambiguity in 
and of the past. In order to become consonant with modernity, the 
beloved of classical poetry would have to be translated into the wide of 
modern fiction realism.38 
 
Thus, marriage became a platform for discussing reform and a site through which the 
state could exert its influence.  
 Film has often used feminized spaces to promote political ideologies, most 
predominantly using women who “as a group are particularly vulnerable to [. . .] 
ideological packaging, [where they are] constructed as visual imagery” meant to 
represent their culture “rather than [to be] sources of information” themselves.39 As a 
gendered space, marriage appears similarly in film and has two predominant functions, as 
Motlagh argues: marriage first acts as a site to discuss and promote political ideologies 
and second, as a physical site through which these ideologies can be put into practice. 
 Motlagh writes that historians have largely focused on the role that marriage has 
played in modernizing Iran through cultural documents but have left out much of Iranian 
literature,40 a gap that she fills by examining several pieces of literary texts. Motlagh’s 
analysis of literary texts calls on scholars to do similar work in analyzing the role that 
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marriage plays in cinema, which serves as a different form of literary text. This chapter 
aims to add to this body of research by setting the social and political history of cinema in 
and women’s movements in Iran necessary to ground analysis of how marriage in post-
Revolutionary cinema acts as a metaphorical platform that continued pre-Revolutionary 
feminist discourse and raised consciousness about women’s rights issues when physical 
movements were regulated after the Islamic Revolution. In continuing these discussions 
on film, marriage enables women’s issues to cross generic boundaries in film allowing 
for the discourse to continue outside of the genre fīlmhā-ye zanān. 
CINEMA AND IRANIAN POLITICS 
 Since the time that cinema first entered Iran during the Qajar Dynasty (1785–
1925) in the early 19th century, it has often taken on a political nature that highlighted 
aspects of Iranian society such as class differences as well as societal factions. On a trip 
to Europe in 1900, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1853–1906) experienced cinema for the first 
time along with his court photographer, Mirza Ebrahim Khan Akkas Bashi, at the 
Exposition in France.41 In his diary Mozaffar al-Din Shah wrote that at “[. . .] 9:00 P.M. 
we went to the Exposition and the Festival Hall where they were showing 
cinematographe, which consists of still and motion pictures. [. . .] We Instructed Akkas 
Bashi to purchase all kinds of [cinematographic equipment] and bring to Tehran so God 
willing he can make some there and show them to our servants.”42 In saying this, 
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Mozaffar al-Din Shah designated cinema as a royal, or at least upper class activity. 
Arguably the first Iranian footage was of Mozaffar al-Din Shah’s trip to Belgium where 
he attended the Festival of Flowers, and this was shown in his court upon his return.43 
Cinema after that circulated amongst the royal family and nobility until the first public 
screening four years later.   
 In 1904, Mirza Ebrahim Khan Sahaf Bashi arranged the first public screening in 
the back of an antique shop. The emergence of a public cinema in Iran in revealed deeper 
political tensions around cinema, as religious conservatives denounced it while secular 
modernists – including Mozaffar al-Din Shah – supported it.44 One year later in 1905 
Sahaf Bashi opened the first Iranian cinema on Cheragh-Gaz Avenue in Tehran but it 
shut down operations just one month after opening in the face of fierce religious 
opposition45 as well as Sahaf Bashi’s involvement in political activities as a nationalist 
who lobbied for a constitutional monarchy.46 Naficy writes that artisanal cinema – 
prominent during the Qajar Dynasty and through the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–
1941) – depended on many factors including political agency, and that the exhibitor’s 
preference in showing certain films over others often reflected their factional social 
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alliances.47 Despite its contentions start, cinema gained traction in Iran as a form of 
popular entertainment although heated debates continued to follow its development. 
  The death of Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1907 gave rise to the public and 
commercial cinema houses, likely due to the loss of court sponsorship, and became 
immersed in sociopolitical debates over its value in Iranian society. Other cinema houses 
rose and fell in the next several years, partially due to their political connections. Russi 
Khan was one of the most successful figures among them because of his connections to 
the Royal court but his cinema house was closed in 1909 with the success of the 
constitutionalists and fall of Mohammad Ali Shah (1907–1909). Religion also had a stake 
in the debate over cinema’s value in society. While religious traditionalists opposed it as 
a corrupting influence on religious tradition because it went against Islamic doctrines that 
objected to visual representation,48 secular modernists viewed it as a tool of education 
and modernity. This binary debate of cinema as a tool of corruption or education would 
haunt Iranian cinema throughout its existence, especially re-emerging after the Islamic 
Revolution49 due to the Pahlavi’s use of cinema during their reign as a tool of 
modernization and the Ayatollah’s use of cinema for educational purposes. 
 The fall of the Qajar Dynasty began in 1909 with the beginnings of the 
Constitutional Revolution and continued through a period of destabilization in Iran 
during World War I (1914–1918) with the occupation of Russian, British and U.S. The 
Constitutional Revolution in Iran (1905–1911) emphasized the desire of Iranians for 
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freedom and nationhood. Revolutionaries demanded the creation of a Parliament on order 
to remove some control from the Royal family and place it into the hands of the public. 
Although a constitution forming a parliament (majles)  was signed in 1906 by Mozaffar 
al-Din Shah, he died only a few days later and his son Mohammad Ali Shah – only 11 
years old at the time – faced many challenges maintaining the new parliament in the face 
of the oncoming World War. Although the Constitutional Revolution did not fully realize 
the ideals of the revolutionaries, it paved the way for Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941) to 
create a nationalist state in the wake of the dissolution of the Qajar Dynasty, which was 
seen as week and susceptible to western manipulation.50 Taking advantage of the 
weakened state of the Qajar Dynasty after the end of World War I, Reza Khan instituted a 
coup d’état in 1923 deposing Ahmad Shah Qajar and becoming the effective ruler, a 
decision that was not solidified until 1925.  
 In 1927, two years after he came to power, Reza Shah Pahlavi aimed to create a 
modern Iran, particularly wishing to emulate the nationalist projects of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk in Turkey (1923–1938).51 The Shah’s modernization project formed its basis on a 
particular interpretation of modernity that included certain aspects of Western societies 
predominantly, and in its realization called for a redefinition of the role of the state within 
Iranian society – a new definition that placed the state as the central focus. During his 
modernization projects, Reza Shah Pahlavi established the use of one language and 
religion, secularized society and national sovereignty, and improved economic 
                                                
50 Parvin Paidar, “Women in the Era of Nation Building,” in Women and the Political Process in 
Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 78–117. 
51 Sima Bahar, “A Historical Background to the Women’s Movement in Iran,” Women of Iran: The 
Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam ed. Farah Azari (London: Ithica Press, 1983), 170-189. 
 21 
participation and emancipation of women.52 The formation of a national army cemented 
the central authority of the state, and it soon became the most powerful authority and 
institution in Iran.53 Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign between 1925 and 1941 was characterized 
by modernization projects, and cinema during this time manifested that ideological 
project in two different ways. First, movies acted as agents of modernity not only for the 
scenes of modern life that they showed, but also for the specific way that they showed 
them. And second, the production of the films themselves embodied modernization 
though their production, distribution, exhibition and consumption practices made possible 
by industrialization, individualism, and consumerism.54  
 Already part of the neocolonial and capitalist Western economies,55 it was 
important for the Shah to maintain and improve Iran’s image as modern, and he used film 
to do that with its emphasis on visuality, constructing a particular vision of a modern Iran 
that would be visible to the rest of the Western world. As the Majlis passed legislation 
regulating culture, fashion, language, gender relation and mass media to fit into this 
modern image of Iran, Iranian society found some favorable while rejecting others, 
creating a hybridized culture both in society and in cinema.56 In this, cinema became a 
powerful medium of negations of change that were taking place in Iran, and in doing so, 
captured many of the ‘in-between’ stages of liminality, as Iranians found themselves 
caught between the ‘what was’ and ‘what will be’ of these projects. 
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 In 1933, Ovanes Ohanian directed the film Hājī Aqā, Aktor-e Sīnemā/Mr. Haji, 
the Movie Actor, which reflected the secularization of Iranian dress regulated by the 
Majlis. This regulation banned traditionally ethnic clothing and headgear in favor of 
Western fashions of trousers, coats and jackets.57 In the film the protagonist, Mr. Haji, 
wears the prescribed Pahlavi dress in favor of traditional garb even though he is religious. 
Similarly, in keeping with the nationalization of Persian as the official language of Iran, 
the movie Ferdowsī (Dir. Abdolhossein Sepanta, 1934) celebrates the Iranian poet 
Abolqasem Ferdowsi creator of the Persian epic Shāhnāmeh. The Shahnameh is widely 
credited for maintaining Iranian national identity for its extensive use of the Persian 
language during a time of Muslim Arab conquest and language domination. Sepanta 
capitalized on the state’s revival of Ferdowsi in making his film,58 and in doing so, 
reinforced the Shah’s nationalization of identity premised on one national language. 
Next, Reza Shah aimed to reform religious practices in Iran. 
 In 1932, Reza Shah banned performances of tā’zīyeh59 as part of his 
modernization project causing the abandonment of major religious gatherings on the one 
hand, and on the other, encouraging engagement in secular activities for entertainment, 
such as cinema.60 Reza Pahlavi’s son, Mohammad Reza Shah, continued this project of 
modernization when he came into power in 1941. His reign represented a new dynamic 
era in Iran, as the highly centralized state was able to control society through extensive 
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instruments61 through which he aimed to continue his father’s work and construct one 
coherent national identity including on religion, one culture and one political power. Not 
least of these instruments is cinema, which he used to craft and present a certain national 
image both within Iran to reinforce state power and ideology and outside of Iran to 
promote a particular modern nationalistic image.62  The Shah used films to promote many 
of his modernistic goals by way of censorship, and marriage became a particularly 
malleable tool both within and outside of cinema to regulate these changes and enforce 
conformity. In order to promote a more modern Iran, the Shah first changed the 
institution of marriage dramatically. 
MARRIAGE: CHANGING WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN IRANIAN SOCIETY 
 In redefining the role of the state, Reza Pahlavi Shah modified the legal system by 
implementing a secular judicial system – one that deviated from the complete control that 
had previously resided within the Islamic clergy. Heavily influenced by European 
systems, family law – including marriage law – was codified as part of the Iranian Civil 
Code (est. 1928–1935). Although the Civil Code was essentially a simplified 
continuation of the traditional Ithna ‘Ashari law practiced by Shi’a Muslims for decades 
before,63 during this codification and up until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, several 
laws and reforms were put into effect that impacted the rights of women, particularly 
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with regards to marriage. Many of these legal revisions occurred alongside growing 
activism from women’s rights groups that aided in supporting these changes. 
 The state-sponsored “women’s awakening”64 movements began in 1926 when 
Reza Shah banned the veiling of women as part of his modernization and secularization 
projects. According to Prime Minister Mahmud Jam, “An ignorant woman who lives 
under the hijab is incapable of preserving her own prestige and honor and is always 
subject to men. [. . .] If women are educated and enter society they can better manage 
their family affairs and their own affairs, as well as provide real support for their men.”65 
In an address given to the students at the first women’s college, the Shah himself said that 
“[t]he women of this country, because of their being aloof from society, could not show 
their abilities and personal qualities. They could not play their role in the building of their 
beloved country and as a result they could not perform their duties towards their 
country.”66 This ban on the veil not only changed women’s visual presentation in society; 
it changed the physical spaces that they could occupy. Previously segregated cinema 
houses, for example, now created a space for same-sex entertainment as well as socially 
coercing adherence to this ban by preventing veiled women from entering.67  
 These women’s movements, however, were still heavily reliant on men and the 
state for their progression, and their inclusion into society was linked to their idealized 
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roles as mothers of the nation. While the state promoted women’s entry into the society 
and education, they were only encouraged to do so when it did not affect their primary 
responsibilities of maintaining a home, rearing their children and taking care of their 
husbands.68 In the face of this inequality, many women’s organizations found firm 
ground for the advancement of women’s rights through absorption into the Shah’s 
modernistic agenda with which they could identify on many levels. The modernization 
agenda of the Pahlavi’s also helped women’s organizations as it aimed to strictly control 
religious institutions, thus aligning the state on the side of these organizations. While in 
the previous period women had to fight Parliament and government, they were now 
ideologically on the same side.69 The most dramatic legal reforms that changed how 
women were able to participate in society came via changes to marriage laws.  
 First, reforms to the legal age of marriage in 1928 prohibited females under the 
age of 13 from marrying and required permission for females under the age of 15. The 
1931 Marriage Law (qānun-i izdivāj) required registration of all marriages and divorces 
and in doing so, gave women legal standing to file for divorce provided the reason was 
justifiable. These laws were precursors for articles in the Family Protection Law (qānun-i 
himayat-i khānivada) (est. 1967) that limited the husband’s rights to divorce by requiring 
all proceedings to be carried out in civil courts rather than extrajudicially.70  In addition, 
the Family Protection Law rose the marriage age of females to 15, as well as restricted 
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polygamy and gave women more rights to divorce.71 Revisions to this law in 1975 rose 
the marriage age of females to 18, modified laws regarding child custody and financial 
compensation for divorced wives.72 During the time of these initial revisions to the 
marriage laws, Reza Shah also promoted women’s social clubs.  
 In 1935 an initiative of Reza Shah formed the “ladies center” as a way to 
encourage women’s participation in society. This center organized lectures, sports clubs, 
adult classes and exhibitions specifically for women. In 1958, various women’s 
organizations grouped together to form the High Council of Women that was headed by 
the Shah’s twin sister, Ashraf Pahlavi. High Council of Women changed its name to the 
Women’s Organization of Iran in 1966.  The ‘White Revolution’ (1963) gave women the 
right to vote and incorporated them into several national corps in charge of health and 
literacy. Although the gender policies at that time may not have penetrated Iranian 
society deeply enough, the state of Iran created legal and social positions for women that 
challenged patriarchal and religious authority over women. Changes in the economy, 
especially under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941– 1978), further challenged 
patriarchy by reimagining the binary of men and women’s roles in the family. 
 In the 1960s, land reform decreased the amount of acreage held by landlords and 
in turn decreased the size of “peasant family plots”73 further emphasized the growing 
divide of gendered roles. This impacted peasant families negatively in many ways, as the 
heads of households often left for the city, seeking compensation in the form of industrial 
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jobs in place of income lost when their plot sizes decreased. As the men left for the cities, 
their wives were left to tend the remaining land along with their children. This need for 
extra labor in the absence of the men increased the exploitation of women and child 
labor, as well as solidifying women’s positions as ‘producers’ of that labor. This had a 
twofold effect on the situation of rural women in Iran. First, it increased the rates of early 
marriage dramatically. According to official figures in 1976, 38% of Iranian women 
between the ages of 15 – the earliest marital age that the Family Protection Law would 
allow at the time – and 19 were married.74 Secondly, these early marriages contributed to 
the already high rates of illiteracy in women, which was reported as 83% in the same 
year, according to the general census.75  
 Yet, however bleak the situation for rural women seemed at this time, women in 
urban centers were able to capitalize on the Shah’s industrialization agenda and were able 
to seek employment, often for the first time. The rate of economically active women 
increased by 53% between 1966–1977, with a 314% increase in social service jobs and a 
1.4% increase in industrial jobs held by women between the same years.76 Literacy rates 
increased as well, jumping from 30% in 1966 to 65% in 197777 as part of the Shah’s 
national project, which included women’s education. The increase of women’s education 
and employment opportunities, in conjunction with the raised legal age of marriage, 
delayed the time of marrying for women, as many preferred to wait to marry until they 
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were older.78 While reforms to the institution of marriage changed women’s participation 
in society including increasing women’s presence in the workplace and educational 
institutions, marriage in cinema played a very different role, encompassing all of society 
into its reformative nature. 
MARRIAGE AS CINEMATIC TOOL OF REFORM  
 Because the nature of the Pahlavi regime allowed for easy and visible 
organization of women’s rights movements and women’s participation in Iran, films 
during this time that overtly portray women’s issues are sparse. We can, however, see 
that marriage still lends itself as a platform for discussion social issues and to promote 
social reform in society. Interestingly enough, the cinematic reforms usually focus on 
men, which could indicate the patriarchal nature of Iranian law and that more nuanced 
methods were needed to control men.  
 The popular movie genre “Dandies” is a product of dandyism in Iran – a 
formation of liminal subjects from the middle class, who did not hold positions of power 
and were not necessarily intellectual, but who occupied the in-between spaces of Iranian 
satiety at enough distance to critique Iranian values and norms.79 Despite their criticism 
of society, they aspired for upward social mobility instilled in them through Western 
education and exposure to Europe, as well as the disruptive social changes due to the 
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Shah’s modernistic agenda. Going to the cinema was seen as a leisure activity, and as 
such, drew many of the aspiring dandies. 
 In nature, dandies were mainly “conformist rebels” 80 who followed the Shah’s 
reforms while at the same time questioning the top-down authoritarian Westernization. 
While dandies imitated Western styles of dress, many desired individuality. 81 Not only 
did they consume Western style, they mimicked its consumer lifestyle as well, and were 
scorned “for debasing the authenticity of native Iranian traditions and for copying 
unwanted Western fashions.”82 On the one hand, dandies embodied the modernization 
goals of the Shah by adopting many aspects of western dress and culture, and on the 
other, represented a falling away from traditional Iranian society. “Dandie” films 
showcased the social liminality of Iranians in negotiating a new Iranian identity while 
caught between the pull of tradition and modernity.  
 This genre creates room for the conflict and struggle for authenticity, in that it 
guides viewers to reject one sense of Iranian-ness for another. In these films, dandies 
were set up as directly opposing lutis who represented true Iranian identity and nativism, 
and who usually emerged victorious in these films.83 That the lutis ultimately win shows 
the possible societal pushback to the Shah’s modernization of Iran as being 
predominately Western while rejecting tradition Iranian values and cultural practices. In 
order to characterize the ‘outsider-ness’ of dandies and the need for their reform, dandies 
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often faced many social problems getting a suitable wife. In this way, proper love and 
marriage was one way that the dandies were turned into appropriate citizen in these films, 
but this process is not always cut and dry. The reforming aspect of marriage in preferring 
Iranian-ness over western-ness is possibly most predominant in the film Mamel-e 
Emrikai/The American Mamal (Dir. Shapur Qarib, 1974).  
 Staring Googoosh and Behrouz Vossoughi, Mamel-e Emrikai/The American 
Mamal embodies the struggle of what constitutes true happiness, social status and wealth 
or happiness in marriage, and whether either comes from Iranian culture, western culture 
or a combination of both. Mamel (Vossoughi) plays a dandy who fixates on the United 
States, embodying its style of dress and speech and always pretending to have just 
returned from or to be going there. When Mamel meets and falls in love with Nasrin 
(Googooh) – who also lives her life pretending to be from a different social class – and 
marriage is proposed, they are forced to confront their imagined identities and decide 
what will make them truly happy. According to Naficy, both Mamel and Nasrin think that 
this impersonation will elevate their social status but in reality only creates a false sense 
of happiness. It is only when they admit to each other that they have been pretending, 
revealing their true identities to each other, and that they do not wish to go to the United 
States anymore, do they genuinely fall in love and prove their Iranian authenticity.84 
Marriage in this film acts as the metaphorical site where this conversation of authenticity 
begins to take place, and ultimately reforms these characters into citizens of Iran who 
realize that their happiness lies in their decision to reject western culture as superior.  
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 Marriage acts in a similarly in Jahelha va Zhigoloha/Tough Guys and Gigolos 
(Dir. Hosain Madani, 1965), but rather than the clash between western and Iranian 
identity, this film uses marriage to enforce proper citizenship in Iran. In this film, a group 
of dandies are in constant conflict with a group of toughs (lutis), and this conflict creates 
room for the audience to decide how to challenge authority. While tough-guy characters 
often embodied chivalry, they also stood for vigilante justice that was premised on one’s 
own sense of morality as it has been shaped by Iranian society. On the other hand, 
dandies challenged authority in a systematic way by recognizing that the authoritative 
nature of the legal system must be changed to incorporate the people. Because the 
conflict creates room for negotiation, so does the conclusion of the film. In the end, one 
of the toughs marries a dandy’s sister and one of the dandies marries a sister of one of the 
toughs and in doing so, the dandies are transformed into moral characters. The moralistic 
transformation occurs in this film through marriage,85 as it was only through love and 
marriage that dandies were made appropriate citizens of Iran.86  While the emphasis is 
placed on the moralistic transformation of the dandies, the combination of these groups 
by both marriages implies that there is a way to take characteristics from each group and 
to transform them in to an acceptable form of citizenship. Unlike the more clear-cut 
ending in Mamel-e Emrikai/The American Mamal, Jahelha va Zhigoloha/Tough Guys 
and Gigolos allows more interpretation from the audience. While these two films more or 
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less focus on creating a certain image of Iranian identity, marriage in film also acted as a 
site to discuss class differences in Iranian society. 
 In many films, such as Ganj-e Qarun/Qarun’s Treasure (Dir. Siamak Yasemi 
1965), marriage acts as a space where moral virtues and class differences can be 
discussed. Ganj-e Qarun/Qarun’s Treasure tells a tale of class differences, where the 
happiness and values of the lower-class are presented as better than that of the upper-
class who has money, but lead empty and purposeless lives. Marriage is the driving force 
of the plot as these classes are brought together haphazardly when Shirin (Foruzan), an 
upper-class socialite, tries to escape an arranged marriage with a man who is only after 
her family’s money. In doing so, she meets and falls in love with ‘Care-free’ Ali 
(Mohammad Ali Fardin) who, until a dramatic plot-twist at the conclusion of the film, 
appears to be from lower-class society. While this film is not focused on marriage per-se, 
it is the major driving plot force that allows for these discussions of class values to take 
place, a discussion that was important in the changing economic climate in Iran. At the 
conclusion of the film, when all is revealed, Shirin as well as Qarun (Arman) – the 
wealthy, but previously unknown, father of Ali – both voice they would choose to give 
up their possessions and adopt a lower-class, and presumably better, lifestyle to be with 
the ones they love. Whether the message is that life in the lower-class strata is actually 
better or whether this film was meant to be a control mechanism to quite the unrest of the 
lower-class is unclear. 
 In these three films, marriage acts as a tool of social reform either in cementing a 
true Iranian national identity, creating proper citizenship, or in creating contentment 
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amongst the lower-class in Iranian society. Marriage is either a metaphorical site, as in 
the case of  Mamel-e Emrikai/The American Mamal and Ganj-e Qarun/Qarun’s Treasure 
where the discourse of these films occurs around marriage, or a the physical site as in 
Jahelha va Zhigoloha/Tough Guys and Gigolos where marriage is the act that reforms 
society. In these films, men are often the focus of these reforms with the women 
following their lead or acting upon them to choose. Where marriage in these films can be 
seen as a form of self-reflexive as audiences still must interpret these films and make the 
choice for themselves, marriage in society legally enforced reform and women were often 
the recipients of these reforms, good or bad. In the beginning, these legal reforms greatly 
improved women’s ability to participate in society, but in the later years of Mohammad 
Pahlavi Shah’s reign, opposition to his regime began to arise in some of these women’s 
organizations as reforms began to slowly stagnate.  
 Opposition to the Shah came in three ways: feminist critique, Marxism, and 
Islamic revivalism. In the first, organizations criticized the dominant practices of Iranian 
society. The Organization of Iranian Women published pamphlets entitled “Women’s 
Image in Iranian T.V. Commercials’ and “The Social Consequences of the Prejudice 
against Women” and investigated the extent to which the Shah was creating positions for 
women in line with the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights (1949).87 Although the Shah 
had created much room for women in society, they were still not seen as equal according 
to this declaration. Secondly, groups such as Our Awakening were so heavily immersed 
in Marxist ideology that they believed armed struggle was the only wait to fight against 
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the Shah’s regime; and thirdly, Islamic revivalism saw a resurgence of religious 
gatherings and support for the re-veiling of women.88 Divisions amongst women’s 
organizations themselves in the form of secularist and religious splits paved the way for 
many of them to support Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Iran in 1979 in the hopes of 
more equal participation in society, but as we will see, legal changes after the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic relegated women to more restricted participation in 
society.89  
CONCLUSION 
 Many changes occurred during the reign of the Pahlavi regime (1925–1978) that 
greatly impacted the situation of women economically, politically and socially. First, the 
shared ideology between the Shah’s modernization projects and women’s rights for 
equality created a climate that allowed organizations to form and fight for these rights. 
During this time, women granted the right to vote, the right to education and the right to 
divorce, among other things. While many of the reforms on the surface had to do with 
women’s political engagement, ability to work and right to education, the subtext of these 
reforms is closely linked to their prescribed Islamic roles as mothers and wives. Islamic 
fundamentalist argued that allowing women to leave the domestic sphere and enter into 
society as more active participants would cause the home and the nuclear family to 
deteriorate. Marriage – as a term that ideologically encompasses motherhood – then, has 
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been a significant site of legal reform and representation with regards to women’s 
participation in society.  
 Women’s organizations that took shape during this period were invaluable in 
progressing the rights of women along with the state, but this development of women’s 
rights caused tensions to increase between modernist and religious fundamentalist parties. 
Cinema, as a medium, also furthered these tensions as modernists saw it as valuable tool 
for education and sign of modernity while religious fundamentalist only saw it as 
corrupting Iranian society. Cinema did, however, become an invaluable medium for 
portraying liminality and negations of these social changes (Mr. Haji, Ferdowsi), as well 
as being a tool for social commentary (The American Mamal, The Tough Guys and the 
Gigolos, Qarun’s Treasure), particularly with its use of marriage as a rhetorical device. 
 These tensions between modernist and religious fundamentalist ultimately paved 
the way for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The 
next chapter will discuss the deterioration of women’s movements in the face of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and how the discourse of women’s rights has been picked up 
and represented in cinema via the platform of marriage when open organization was 
restricted. In demonstrating the political nature of films in the Pahlavi era, as well as the 
ways in which marriage has been used to re-structure society, we can begin to see how 
film and marriage are vehicles through which these women’s issues are voiced after the 
Islamic Revolution. 
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Chapter 2:  Women and Marital Rights in Post-Revolutionary Cinema 
Iranian films that fall into the genre of fīlmhā-ye zanān90 are Iranian ‘social’ films 
that deal with women’s issues that stem from patriarchal domination in society. These 
films often portray issues of divorce, polygamy, co-wives, and child custody rights and 
are political in nature because they challenge patriarchal values and institutions in 
society.91 Traditionally, women’s films are defined as films that reflect women’s 
experiences and are produced by female directors.92 Originally coined by the Women’s 
Liberation movement in the U.S., Feminist consciousness raising asks women to draw on 
their own life experiences in order to come to a collective definition of what constitutes 
injustice.93 Kathie Sarachild, in 1978, said that consciousness raising was one of the most 
effective tools because it often involved women who were not politically minded to begin 
with.94  
Consciousness raising is particularly relevant to the Iranian context as women’s 
organizations that the government deemed as politically sensitive were hard to form, and 
that women, relatively new to participation in society had to be eased into political 
engagement.95 Several of the women’s organizations that can trace their roots to 
organization that supported Khomeini found it difficult to survive in post-Revolutionary 
Iran, and discontinued their activities by the early 1980’s. As Amy Motlagh has argued, 
the metaphorical platform of marriage in literature allows for the discussion of current 
societal issues, and while marriage allows acts in a similar way in film by carrying social 
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discourse in film, it also allows women’s rights discourse to transgress the generic 
boundaries of fīlmhā-ye zanān. In doing so, women’s rights issues appear in many films 
that are not classified as women’s films breaking generic limitations and allowing them 
to raise social consciousness in a greater way.  
 This chapter, then, aims to explore how two Iranian films that are not formally 
defined as fīlmhā-ye zanān – Hāmoun (Dir. Dariush Mehrju’i, 1990) and 
Āsheghāneh/Romantic (Dir. Alireza Davoudnejad, 1995) – reflect the legal systems in 
place during this time with relations to women’s rights in marriage and for obtaining 
divorce. While the stories are not solely focused on marriage or divorce per say, they rely 
heavily on the current legal system to advance their plots. Through this progression, we 
are better able to understand the nuances of this legal system, its implication on men and 
women, and some of the ways these laws are able to manifest in reality.96 Through 
contextualization and analysis of these films, I argue that marriage in these films creates a 
platform for the continuation of the women’s fight for equality in marriage and divorce 
that began in early 1900’s but whose movements were brought to a halt after the Islamic 
Revolution. I also argue that these films still present conflicts that remain restricted by 
censorship laws and conform to the dominant Islamic narrative despite Khatami’s 
reforms. 
WOMEN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Reza Shah Pahlavi greatly improved 
women’s ability to participate in society due to legal reforms of his own, as well as 
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continuing projects of his father, Mohammad Reza Shah. However, society still viewed 
women as inferior to men. One of the most notable differences between men and 
women’s ability to participate equally in society, and ultimately what lead to a vast 
majority of support for Khomeini from women, came from participation in education.97 
As the women’s education progressed, many young women became more politically and 
socially aware, as well as less satisfied in the repressive society and inequality of their 
citizenship under the Pahlavis. In order to gain support, however, Iranian women had to 
learn how to couch their demands in a way that appealed to the traditional sensibilities of 
Iranian society, support that was necessary to grow and maintain if women wished to face 
clerical opposition and solidify recognition as citizens in their own rights, not only as 
mothers to the Iranian nation.98 In the almost 20 years preceding the Islamic Revolution 
(1979) women were able, through the provisions of the Family Protection Law, to 
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achieve the right to actively participate in political aspects of society,99 and the continued 
to exercise this right throughout the Revolution.  
 During the Revolution, it was these politically engaged women who made up 
many of the women’s organizations that supported the overthrow of the Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi.100 Many of these women were instrumental in bringing attention to 
women’s issues, such as child-care for working mothers and being allowed to have a 5-
day workweek. Against these women, however, was a religious movement that 
encouraged Muslim women to seek “emancipation through Islam” rather than equality of 
rights, as Islam still presumed women inferior to men and thus undeserving of equal 
rights.101  
 Islam quickly became the “solution” that would rid Iran of Pahlavi rule and was 
supported by the Islamic clergy as Iran’s salvation. Iran’s integration into the world’s 
capitalist system along with policies of the Pahlavi regime had seemed to create a dearth 
of social problems and an inefficient political system. Failures in the Iranian political 
system had left a trail of disenfranchisement and disillusion that spread far and wide in 
Iran. “The calamities of  ‘Communism’ and the collapse of nationalism were skillfully 
used by Islamic ideologues as evidence of the inevitability of the rise of Islam.”102 The 
massive involvement of women in revolutionary movements against the Shah signaled a 
new shift in women’s politics, and they believed that this involvement would be repaid 
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with an expansion of women’s rights.103 However, women under the new Islamic 
Republic of Iran were forced back into traditional roles. 
 The establishment and reforms of the Family Protection Law were highly 
regarded as un-Islamic, as they removed power over family matters from the religious 
judges and placed them entirely in the realm of the civil courts. In the case of marriage 
especially, as a divine duty in Islam, this was unacceptable and one of the many driving 
forces behind the Islamic Revolution of 1979. During the Islamic Revolution, the Family 
Protection Law was attacked heavily and after seven months the Special Civil Court Act 
placed family law back in the sphere of Shi’a law under religious judges.104 This short act 
containing only 19 articles erased much of the pre-revolutionary legal reforms, including 
some of the advancements achieved for women’s rights during the reign of the Pahlavis. 
Women did not just participate in the Revolution as ‘women,’ but as member of Iranian 
society representing different political and social forces. “The massive participation of 
women in the Revolution and their active presence in post-Revolutionary society situated 
within such ideological conditions, then, gave rise to the ‘question of women’.”105 When 
asked about the role of women in the new society of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
January 23, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini replied that“[t]he Islamic government will decide 
on these issues. Now is not the time to give my views on this matter. Women, like men, 
will participate in building the future Islamic society.”106  
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 In another speech given at the Feyzieh School of Theology in Qom on March 4, 
1979, Khomeini again addressed the role and rights of women, giving special attention to 
their rights in marriage: 
 
God’s blessings be upon you lion-hearted women whose great effort saved 
Islam from the captivity of foreigners. It was you dear and brave sisters 
who alongside men secured the victory of Islam.[. . .]The Qur’an is a 
human-maker and women too are human-makers. If nations are deprived 
of brave and human-making women they will be defeated and ruined. [. . 
.] Women must have a say in their fate. [. . .] Men and women must 
reconstruct this ruin together. The question we must consider is that when 
women want to marry they can ask for certain powers for themselves that 
will be neither against Shar’ia [religious law] nor against their own 
honours. For example, they can lay down a condition that if the husband is 
corrupt or ill-treats the woman she can be the proxy for divorce. Islam has 
recognized rights for women [. . .].107 
 
 
This speech highlights three important elements of women’s roles in Iranian 
society and the inequality of their citizenship in relation to men created by the Islamic 
Republic.108 First, it shows that they are highly valued as the mothers of the nation, both 
in producing offspring but also in educating and bringing up proper citizens of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.109  Secondly, it highlights the inequality of divorce rights 
between men and women. According to this speech, men posses the sole rights to divorce 
unless women make provisions prior to the marriage contract. This can also be seen in the 
actual Persian words used to talk about divorce. When talking about women, the word for 
divorce is talāq gereftan (get divorce) but one uses talāq dādan (give divorce) when 
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referring to men. Some scholars see the exclusivity of divorce rights for men as offsetting 
the rights to propose marriage, an offer traditionally carried out by women or their 
families.110 Third, this speech also signified to the rest of the world that women’s 
involvement in revolutionary movements did not go against their traditional Islamic roles 
as wives and mothers,111 contrary to what many western feminists believed.  
 The backwards slide of the ability of women to participate in their own marriages 
and divorces after the Islamic Revolution is reflected not only in these speeches and 
revisions to the law, it can also bee seen in the decline of women’s movements during 
this time.112 Compared to the previous political era where women’s organizations could 
embody many political stances, women’s organizations from this moment had to be 
situated in ‘total’ ideology, meaning that they were either seen as completely for or 
against Islam. Even when women’s movements changed their ideology to match that of 
Khomeini’s, they still found it difficult to survive. 
 The Democratic Association of Iranian Women (Tashkilat-e Democratic-e Zanān-
e Iran )113 is a women’s organization that was originally a part of the pro-Soviet 
Communist Tudeh Party that first appeared in Iran in 1941 and was active and popular 
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until it was banned by Mohammad Reza Shah in 1953,114 re-emerging as Pro-Khomeini 
years later. This group called for the quality of women in all areas of life, not only in the 
home. They demanded to be included in elections, unions and parliament; they called for 
free education for women who, although mostly uneducated, were responsible for raising 
and educating children; and because society placed so much of domestic responsibilities 
on the shoulders of women, this organization argued that industry in any country could 
not fully develop without women and called for equal wages for employment. This 
organization, working mainly as a propaganda agent for the Tudeh party among women, 
actually aimed to deny their communist identity and to align itself with Muslim women. 
In doing so, it went much farther than most organizations and had little opposition to its 
movements outside of government. Although this group ideologically located itself in the 
mainstream of government-initiated projects, it was never allowed to be present as an 
organization.115  
 Many women’s organizations implanted other tactics that aligned themselves with 
Khomeini without explicitly saying so, and they, too, met with opposition and died out 
quickly. The National Union of Women (Etehad-e Melli-e Zanān) formed in March 1979 
on the basis Iranian nationalism and of women’s necessary participation in society for its 
advancement and protection. According to their founding announcement, society is not 
divided by gender lines, but by exploiter and exploited, and because of this, they vowed 
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not to support any political force that was dependent on America or any foreign power.116 
The division amongst women’s organization is again made clear by their second 
principle:  
In relation to women’s organizations, we will not co-operate with any of 
those who have not stated their political positions clearly, or those who 
situate women in opposition to revolutionary forces or with reactionary 
groups who attempt to mobilize women along deviationary and secondary 
issues at this sensitive time.117 
 
This women’s organization published a fortnightly paper, Barabari (Equality), followed 
by the women’s magazine Zan Dar Mobarezeh (Woman in Struggle), which was 
eventually banned. During the autumn of 1980, the NUW underwent a change into pro- 
or anti-government factions. After the split, many opportunities for uniting with other 
women’s organizations were lost and the activities of the NUW eventually halted,118 
along with the activities of many of the originations they could have partnered with.119   
 The restrictive nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran made it virtually impossible 
for women’s rights movements to continue by relegating women back into subservient 
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positions and limiting their participation in society to non-political activities. In doing so 
women’s rights discourse found it’s way into societal discussion through other platforms 
that were harder to restrict to physically, such as cinema. The continuation of this 
discourse in film can be seen through the representation of in marriage laws in the films 
themselves, but also in the reviews of these films in Iranian periodicals that often include 
a discussion of the legal implications of the film and how those affect women. 
MARRIAGE IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY CINEMA 
 Popular cinema in Iran remains a leisure activity that survived the regime change 
from the Pahlavis to Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, although it did change in 
nature. At the conclusion of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini began the purification 
process of Iran, and because cinema was considered a tool used by the Pahlavis to bring 
corruption into Iran, this process included a purification of cinema. Women – seen by 
Khomeini as corruptors of society through their often promiscuous and anti-Islamic 
representations in Pahlavi era cinema – quickly became one of the visible symbols of this 
purification process, and their appearance on film was highly regulated so as to fit into 
the appropriate Islamicate model of womanhood. Scenes from previously popular Pahlavi 
era films, now considered “un-Islamic,” were sometimes edited with a magic marker to 
cover exposed body parts of women, making these films acceptable to show once 
again.120 
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  Had Ayatollah Khomeini not viewed cinema as a tool of education, when used 
properly, Iranian cinema could have ceased to exist at this time.121  However, financially 
suffering from the Islamic Revolution and entering into the Iran-Iraq (1980–1988) just 
one year after the revolution meant that the government had to take measures to ensure 
the financial stability of the film industry. Fortunately for filmmakers and moviegoers 
alike, Ayatollah Khomeini personally requested that Mohammad Khatami return to Iran 
from Germany in order to take part in the administration of the new Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Of the many notable positions that he held before and after his presidency (1997–
2005), his tenures as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1982–1986 and 1989–
1992) had the most impact on Iranian cinema.   
 During his first term as minister, the government created the Ministry of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance (est. 1982) 122 and the Farabi Cinema Foundation (est. 1983)123 in 
order to control films through a system of censorship regulations while at the same time 
providing funding for approved film projects. This three-pronged system included 
support (hemayat), supervision (nezarat), and guidance (hedayat).124 In this way, the 
government consolidated power and reinforced its revolutionary ideals through the 
financial encouragement and international exportation of films that met the criteria for 
their political agenda. The process for screening films at the MCIG included reviewing 
screenplays, issuing film production licenses, previewing rough cuts, final review and 
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issuance of exhibition licenses.125 Complaints against early Islamic cinema included poor 
quality of films and low entertainment value imposed by the moralistic criteria that must 
be met.126 Khatami in his first term sought to encourage quality filmmaking, a project that 
was carried out in collaboration with Fakhreddin Anvar, deputy of cinematic affairs, and 
Mohammad Beheshti, head of the Farabi Cinema Foundation.127 Their efforts were 
supported by Hashemi Rafsanjani – chairman of the Iranian Parliament (1980–1989) and 
fourth president of Iran (1989–1997) – who, in 1985, authorized entertainment and joy in 
film. Previously to this, and since the success of the revolution, films had primarily been 
judged based on their political and instructional values. In conjunction with Rafsanjani’s 
support, Khatami declared: 
I believe that cinema is not the mosque…. If we remove cinema from its 
natural place, we will no longer have cinema….If we transform cinema to 
such an extent that when one enters a movie house one feels imposed upon 
or senses that leisure time has changed to become homework time, then 
we have deformed society.128 
 
In addition to revitalizing the film industry by lowering taxes on cinema tickets, 
subsidizing the importation of equipment and funding film productions with low interest 
loans,129 Khatami, Beheshti and Anvar also aimed to create a rating system to inspire 
more creativity and better quality of cinematic techniques. 
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 The rating system used by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) 
had initially been created to encourage technical improvements in film, but was often 
used to identify and support films that had an overt Islamic agenda. Films were rated on a 
letter scale ranging from ‘A’ to ‘D’ that was based on three criteria: technical aspects, 
aesthetics and content. While technical aspects included improvements in filming 
equipment and new, innovative aesthetics were encouraged, better content was often 
determined by closeness the Islamic Republics ideals.130 Because higher ratings often 
meant more funding from the MCIG, filmmakers often pandered to this last criterion, 
stymieing many improvements in the overall qualify of films. However, the political 
landscape changed dramatically during his second term at the MCIG and enabled the 
creation of a new post-revolutionary reform cinema. 
 With the death of Khomeini in 1989 and entry into his second term at the Ministry 
of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Khatami encouraged a looser interpretation of 
supervision in terms of the film production process.131 In this chapter, it is films from this 
period but before his presidency that will be analyzed in combination with the cinematic 
reforms that affected their production, the marital laws they represent, and the societal 
discussion that they aroused in order discover what they say about marriage in Iranian 
society at this time as well as to discover if films at this time really were more free to 
break away from the “mosque”-like feeling that Khomeini tried to break away from. One 
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of the most creative films to come out of this early reform that pushes cinematic 
boundaries is Hāmoun directed by Dariush Mehrju’i.132 
 An early pioneer of Iranian cinema, Dariush Mehrju’i continues to be counted 
as one of the most influential filmmakers in Iranian cinema.133 Many authors such as 
Hamid Naficy, Blake Atwood, Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, Himid Reza Sadr, Shahab 
Esfandiary and Shahla Mirbakhtyar, have included Dariush Mehrju’i and a number of 
his films in their historiographies and analyses of Iranian Cinema, but never in terms 
of marriage as this chapter aims to. In terms of genre, all of his films can’t be said to 
fall into one, but according to the Iranian publication Film, a number of Mehrju’i’s 
films received the most votes by critics as qualifying as ‘national’ films in the post-
Revolutionary context,134 and many of his films are considered political in nature.  
 His early film Gāv/The Cow (1969) written in collaboration with dissident writer 
Gholam-Hossein Sa'edi, “legitimized cinema as an intellectual medium rather than being 
the property of commercial forces or government institutions.”135 Immediately the film 
was banned for its negative portrayal of the rural countryside in Iran, something that the 
Shah wished to keep out of film. The ban on this film in Iran can be seen as an 
embodiment of the difficult and complicated relationship between filmmakers and the 
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state, with sponsorship and censorship of film both being carried out by the predecessor 
to the MCIG, the Ministry of Cultural and Art (MCA). 
 New Wave cinema was essentially considered a dissident cinema that criticized 
the current social conditions of Iran. Because of this, filmgoers were almost programed to 
find the political message in films of certain directors who were considered committed to 
politics.136 As Mehrju’i states, ‘Artistic works were then only studied from a political 
point of view to see to what extent they spoke of people’s grievances and the tough 
existing conditions.’”137 And that is exactly what we see in his film Hāmoun (1990). 
WHAT IS ‘EVIDENCE’ ENOUGH? 
 Dariush Mehrju’i’s Hāmoun tells the story of a man, Hamīd (Khosro 
Shakibai) recently returned from the Iran-Iraq war who now works at an 
import-export firm while also pursuing his Ph.D. His wife, Mashīd (Bita 
Farahi), is an abstract artist from a substantially more wealthy family. Despite 
her family’s protestation, Mashīd married Hamīd, initially attracted by his 
intellectualism. Seven years after they are married, however, Mashīd feels that 
Hamīd is holding her back from accomplishing something truly meaningful in 
life and seeks divorce.138 While this alone is not an acceptable reason for 
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divorce, it is also insinuated that Hamīd often takes his work and academic 
frustrations out on her, and may have physically beaten her.  
 The first few minutes of the film show Hamīd working on his 
dissertation, “Abraham’s Love and Faith,” in which he tries to ascertain the 
real reasons that Abraham was willing to kill his son Isaac. Was it out of 
obedience or love? Hamīd narrates the first lines of his dissertation, “Mankind 
divorces himself from what he loves because he doesn’t want to want,” and 
after penciling in a correction, continues, “He loves but wishes to hate. He 
hopes, but hopes to hope not. He remembers, but wishes to forget.” A brisk 
wind suddenly blows his loose dissertation pages away, foreshadowing the 
impeding dissolution of his marriage by visually representing the idea of 
divorce on paper, but also in the preoccupation of his thoughts. At that 
moment, his divorce lawyer comes in to get him ready for court confirming 
that divorce lies on the horizon. In a conversation they have together, he tells 
Hamīd that it is time to let Mashīd go, something Hamīd claims to have done. 
We get a sense for the character, and possible selfishness, of Hamīd when his 
lawyer responds, “No. You want everybody to love you, but you don’t do 
anything,” implying that he hasn’t done anything to deserve this love. 
 Mashīd claims that she is filing for divorce because Hamīd has ignored 
his responsibilities as a husband, namely, providing for them financially. This 
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provision is stipulated in the Iranian Civil code (ICC)139 and violation of this 
stipulation grants women permissible grounds for divorce, if provable. She 
also claims that he beats her and is psychotic. The rest of the film sees Hamīd 
emotionally unable to deal with the fact that his wife does not love him 
anymore, eventually leading him attempt suicide in the ocean. Somewhat 
traditional to Iranian films, the conclusion of Hāmoun is left ambiguous and up 
for interpretation. As Hamīd floats face down in the ocean, a few men 
suddenly pull him out of the water and into their fishing boat and as Hamīd 
slowly opens his eyes and gains consciousness, the credits roll leaving the 
ending to be determined by the audience. 
 While this film was created after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 
1989) and during the reforms instituted by Mohammad Khatami during his 
tenures (1982–1986 and 1989–1992) as the minister at the Ministry of Culture 
and Islamic Guidance, a time of relative creative freedom in cinema, this film 
still draws heavily upon Islamic ideology when creating this dilemma. By 
situating the issue of the divorce in a religious context, that of Abraham, 
audiences are asked to determine which solution is more religious: 
reconciliation or divorce? Audiences are also forced to question whether or not 
Mashīd is living up to the ideological Islamic wife. 
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 The problems between the two, although handled poorly by Hamīd, 
seem to stem from Mashīd’s desire to have an impact on society outside of the 
home; a desire that is antithetical to the patriarchal confinement of women to a 
role whose primary significance remains inside the obligations of wife and 
mother, and whose arena in life should first and foremost be the home. If 
Mashīd did not have this desire for an outside role in society, would she still 
have felt that Hamīd was holding her back, and filed for divorce? Also absent 
are her interactions with her child. How can a mother with her focus outside of 
the home raise good Iranian citizens? In her pursuit of creating something 
meaningful, she seems to ignore her Islamic obligations as a wife and a 
mother, and as a patriotic mother for the nation.  In addition Mashīd’s 
seemingly improper outward focus with relation to an ideological Islamic 
society that promotes inward focus on the household, what legal implications 
for women are presented in this film? As mentioned previously, Mashīd sues 
for divorce on the grounds that Hamīd is not providing for her financially. 
Several statutes of the Iranian Civil Code work together and must be 
considered in order to contextualize the validity of Mashīd’s case against 
Hamīd.  
 First, according to Article 1105 of the Iranian Civil Code, the wife must 
agree in a permanent marriage to let the husband exercise control as the head 
of the household, and in return for her submission, the wife is entitled to 
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financial support.140 These obligations include payment for living expenses 
such as housing, clothing, and food. Interestingly, this law requires that the 
husband pay this financial support commensurate to the wife’s social status, 
including hiring a maid if she is accustomed to having one.141 In order to 
maintain this financial support, the wife must also fulfill her nuptial 
obligations regularly, unless she has justifiable reason not to do so. For 
example, Article 1127 allows a wife to refuse to engage in sexual relations 
with her husband if he has contracted a venereal disease after their marriage.142  
However, if a wife meets this marital conditions and her husband refuses 
financial support, she may file a complaint with the Special Civil Tribunal, 
which will result in the compulsory renewal of the financial support or give 
her legal grounds to obtain divorce. 
 As we see in Hāmoun, Mashīd attempts to gain divorce by claiming 
that Hamīd no longer gives her the required financial support. She goes so far 
as to say that this lack of financial support also extends to their child who, by 
law, is entitled to financial support and education.143 Both parents, not only the 
father, share this obligation.  While Mashīd’s claims seem legally viable, 
Hamīd denies ever keeping financial support from her. What then is Mashīd to 
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do in order to obtain this divorce? In the film, she claims that Hamīd also hits 
her, which he does indeed do once in the film during an argument, and that he 
is insane. But is this enough for the judge to grant divorce?  
 Although Ayatollah Khomeini reversed many of the 1967 amendments 
to the Family Protection Law (FPL) when he came into power after the 
Revolution, some of these amendments carried through into post-
Revolutionary Iranian law, specifically laws with regards to divorce. 144 
Marriage contracts for women still contained two stipulations that protected 
certain rights on marriage, one of which gives women the right to seek divorce 
under certain conditions, if they can prove them. In Hāmoun, Mashīd draws on 
two conditions to seek divorce: one seeks the right to divorce on the grounds 
of his mistreatment – physically – of her, and the other seeks divorce on the 
grounds of his insanity.  
 Ziba Mir-Hosseini recorded a similar case in her documentary Divorce 
Iranian Style: Family Courtrooms in Iran (1998), in which the wife claims 
that her husband has beat her and her son. Through interviews, we learn that 
she actually does not wish to obtain a divorce, only to force her husband to 
sign a contract legally requiring him to find a new job and resume the financial 
support of their family. So while Mashīd may indeed have legal grounds on 
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which to obtain a divorce from Hamīd, we don’t see her presenting any real 
evidence of his mistreatment or insanity. 
  The dissolution of their marriage is another aspect left to the 
imagination of the audience as Hamīd is pulled out of the sea without a 
resolution, perhaps Mashīd does not supply the court with anything of 
evidentiary value proving Hamīd’s insanity or mistreatment of her. While 
Hāmoun draws on many elements of the Iranian Civil Code in setting up the 
conflict between this couple, Mehrju’i does not offer a concrete solution, but it 
is not hard to image that this marriage does not end in divorce as Mashīd 
desires. What does this film say, then, about women’s marriage rights at this 
time? 
 Censorship regulations by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance at this time prohibited any film that insulted “directly or indirectly 
the prophets, imams, the supreme jurisprudent, the leadership council or the 
qualified jurisprudents.”145 In other words, films criticizing or going against 
Iranian law found it hard to gain exhibition permits. As we have seen, Hāmoun 
directly engages with Iranian marriage laws in effect at this time, but never 
openly presents a critique of them. Although the marriage between the two is 
anything but wonderful, Mashīd’s characterization of a woman seeking 
divorce on grounds that are somewhat shaky and hard to prove on an 
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evidentiary level in court seems to overshadow Hamīd’s irrational and, at 
times, psychotic and suicidal personality. 
 Many of the cinematic regulations at this time concerned themselves 
with women’s representations in films, particularly their sexuality, and aimed 
to restrict any film that highlighted improper behavior that could be emulated 
in society. In the early years of the Islamic Republic of Iran, filmmakers even 
cautioned each other on using women at all in their films in order to avoid 
moral dilemmas.146 Women in film were supposed to appear as they would in 
society: as proper models of womanhood in appearance and manner. In this 
film, Mashīd does embody the aspects of an ideal Islamic wife or mother, and 
perhaps this is why she is not granted divorce, even if Hamīd’s poor treatment 
of her is true. Granting divorce to a possibly less-than moral character would 
be going against both of these cinematic guidelines. Mehrju’i’s plot, however, 
cleverly plays with the nuances of marriage laws in Iran at this time in a way 
that raised discussion about the inequality of these laws. 
 A recent article in Fīlm magazines published in 2010 calls Hamīd 
Hāmoun’s character “deep” as well as satirical as it critics Iranian intellectuals 
view of how daily love is wrongly imagined in society.147 At the time that 
Hāmoun was released, however, film presented a different view. In an article 
that translates to “Misunderstanding,” Shahram Jafari Nejad writes that 
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Hāmoun’s character is insensitive and doesn’t embody true Iranian cultural 
values or present a good view of nationality in the way that he treats his 
wife.148  While both of these articles take opposing stances on Hamīd’s, they 
both agree that his character critiques some aspect of marriage and love in 
Iranian society in its unrealistic, or possibly less than idyllic, portrayal. In 
combination, both unconsciously remark on the creative nature of the film 
industry at this time as well as the continued state censorship that lead to 
unnatural portrayals of marriage by taking these opposite stances. This 
narrative of unrealistic or ambiguous solutions to marital problems does not 
solely exist in Hāmoun but can be found in many Iranian films.  
 Despite the lack of attention in academia so far, possibly due in part to the 
unavailability of this film with English subtitles or because it was made outside of 
Iranian cinema’s “golden period,”149 Āsheghāneh/Romantic (1995) has much to 
contribute to the discourse of Iranian cinema and its portrayal of marriage. 
Similarly to Hāmoun in method, marriage acts to discuss social issues acts in 
this film, namely the familiar conflict between tradition and modernity in 
Iranian society and what that means for women. 
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WEALTH AND DIVORCE 
 In contrast to Hāmoun, not much has been written about 
Āsheghāneh/Romantic, either in English or Persian, despite the prestige of its 
director, Ali-Reza Davoudnejad. In fact, only three articles can be found in 
film and they primarily discuss the production crew rather than the content of the 
film. During his career, Davoudnejad directed and produced at least 19 films 
starting in the early 1970’s, completing his latest film in 2011. Davoudnejad 
was also one of three Iranian film directors – including Dariush Mehrju’i – 
who, together with Iranian actress Karimi, made up the group of Iranian film 
practitioners who met on an online website in 1999 with a group of American 
film practitioners and discussed the dialogue between their two cinemas.150 
 Surprisingly, Āsheghāneh/Romantic has rarely, if ever, been discussed, 
although Davoudnejad is well known as a director.  Despite the lack of attention 
in academia so far, possibly due in part to the unavailability of this film with 
English subtitles, Āsheghāneh/Romantic acts similarly to Hāmoun in it’s use of 
marriage to discuss social issues, namely the familiar conflict between 
tradition and modernity in Iranian society and what that means for women. The 
most apparent similarity between these two films, however, is that they both share 
the actor Khosro Shakibai as a principle protagonist.  
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 Starkly contrasting the role he plays in Hāmoun, where he seems to be 
more concerned with education than wealth, in Āsheghāneh/Romantic Shakibai 
plays the role of a rapacious man (Nāder) who finds himself the intended victim 
of a murderous scheme all the while perusing a woman (Ghāzāl) who is already 
engaged. Independently wealthy wives also feature prominent roles in both films 
– Mashid in Hāmoun and Nāder’s wife, Āfaq, in Āsheghāneh/Romantic. Both 
films also feature the idea of separation – specifically divorce in the case of 
Hāmoun – and how men, despite the financial status of their wives in these cases, 
still hold more power in the marital relationship. Different in each film is who 
seeks the separation, the reason for the separation and what Iranian laws are 
highlighted in each film. 
 Āsheghāneh/Romantic opens with a group of unseen people singing 
joyfully as the camera pans down from the treetops to a peaceful scene in a park 
where family and friends are gathered to celebrate the engagement of Ghāzāl and 
her fiancé Ārash. After a brief speech by Ghāzāl’s mother, the music takes on an 
eerie and dramatic tone and through the help of the camera lens, we see a 
mysterious pair of men behind the seated guests. Ghāzāl’s father proceeds to walk 
through the throng and approaches the man, who we learn to be a friend of the 
family, Nāder, who expresses doubts about Ārash as suitable partner for Ghāzāl. 
In a later scene, Nāder generously offers to find Ghāzāl a proper suitor, one with 
financial stability that can care for her fully. Shortly after, we learn that Nāder’s 
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interest in finding Ghāzāl a suitor is not as altruistic as he presents it to be, and 
that he actually desires her for himself. 
 Necessarily, there are several complex dynamics between the characters 
that complicate this plot. First and foremost, Nāder already has a wife – Āfaq. The 
relationship between Nāder and his wife is tumultuous at best. Through the film 
we discover that he primarily married her for her money, and does not truly love 
her and causes many bitter fights between the two. After their marriage, Āfaq also 
discovers that she is unable to bear children. In combination, this allows Nāder to 
easily fall in love with the beautiful Ghāzāl and to devise a plan that he hopes will 
sever the engagement between her and Ārash. Several questions arise from this 
particular scenario. 
 If Nāder’s character is morally questionable, and his intentions for 
marrying Āfaq had been primarily tied to her financial assets, why is he 
eventually considered a wealthy suitor for Ghāzāl when the money is actually his 
wife’s? Why does Nāder never seek divorce from Āfaq even though he hopes to 
marry Ghāzāl? How does Āfaq’s infertility affect their marriage? And finally, 
which laws from the Iranian Civil Code are highlighted in this film and how are 
they presented? In order to answer these questions and gain a more meaningful 
understand of this film, laws with regards to inheritance, infertility and 
permissibility of multiple wives, will be discussed in relation to this plot. 
 “Inheritance” is generally understood as property left behind by the 
deceased, and unless specified otherwise in a legal document, is usually left to a 
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family member(s). While the Iranian Civil Code also operates with this definition 
of inheritance, it divides inheritance for women in two ways: first, inheritance 
from parents to child; and second, inheritance from child to parents. Because only 
the first is present in Āsheghāneh/Romantic, discussion will be limited to a child’s 
inheritance from his/her parents.  
 Article 907 of the Iranian Civil Code states that a daughter can be the sole 
beneficiary of familial property if she is the only child.151 In the case of two 
daughters, the inheritance is split equally; however, in the case of multiple 
children of different genders, a daughter’s inheritance will only be half of the 
son’s inheritance. This rule applies regardless of whether the deceased is the 
mother or father. What we see in Āsheghāneh/Romantic is mostly implied rather 
than stated. Āfaq’s father has already passed when we enter this story, and has left 
all of his finances to his daughter – with the exception of some of his property, a 
decision that will be discussed later. Upon signing the marriage contract, or aqd, 
Āfaq’s possessions, including her money, immediately became Nāder’s. With this 
transfer of assets, Nāder finds himself in a position to offer himself as a wealthy 
suitor to Ghāzāl. In the film, Ghāzāl’s parents are highly influential in her 
decision making process, and almost push her to make decisions she does not 
wish to make. Both parents seem happy with Ghāzāl’s fiancé Ārash in the 
beginning of the film, but later urge her to consider Nāder. This change occurs 
due to some tricky maneuvering by Nāder. 
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 As mentioned earlier, not all of Āfaq’s property was left to her, why? For 
reasons mad unclear in the film, Āfaq’s father did not fully trust her with his 
property, so he left his house, car and the like to Ghāzāl’s father had – who had 
worked for Āfaq’s father most of Ghāzāl’s childhood – in order to ensure its 
proper maintenance. Nāder’s interest in Ghāzāl is a direct result of this family 
connection, and also how he manipulates Ghāzāl’s parents. In return for Āhad 
signing over the remaining property to Nāder, Nāder promises to find Ghāzāl a 
worthy suitor, someone who is financially stable and can offer her the life she 
deserves. At first Āhad is tentative, but finally consents to the agreement in light 
of Ārash’s lower economic standing. Āhad is also unaware that Nāder has himself 
in mind. With his plan in place, how does Nāder legally intend to marry a Ghāzāl 
when he is still married to Āfaq? 
 While Nāder seems to love Ghāzāl purely on her own merit – as she has 
nothing to offer financially – Āfaq’s infertility provides Nāder the legal grounds 
to obtain a second wife.152 According to the Iranian Civil Code, it is permissible 
for a man to have up to four wives153 under certain conditions. Although no 
specific guidelines for polygamy are set for men in Iranian legal codes, infertility 
of the wife is a legal reason for obtaining a co-wife, as producing offspring is 
desired in Islam. The husband must first obtain permission from his first wife in 
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order to obtain a co-wife. He also must be able to provide for both – or all – wives 
equally, an aspect that will be discussed at length in the subsequent chapter. This 
law does not, however, extend to women whose husbands are infertile. With these 
laws in mind, it is easy to see how Nāder could marry Ghāzāl without changing 
his marital status to Āfaq, assuming that she were to give permission, a topic that 
is never actually broached in this film.  
 At the conclusion of the film, Nāder concedes to Ārash after Ārash saves 
his life in a dramatic plot twist. So all ends happily for Ghāzāl and Ārash. Nāder 
also seems to be more content with his situation in life, but it is never made clear 
what becomes of his relationship with his wife. What are we to do with this 
ambiguous ending? 
 Both Hāmoun and Āsheghāneh/Romantic take a stance on marriage and 
divorce that fits the dominant societal narrative: that marriage should be preserved 
despite unfavorable conditions in the marriage and that women’s agency in 
obtaining a divorce is comparatively unequal to men as seen. Not only do these 
films embody the actual Persian words talāq gereftan (get divorce – women) and 
talāq dādan (give divorce – men), they take advantage of the creative freedom in 
displaying less than idyllic aspects of Iranian society, such as Hāmoun’s abusive 
and psychotic nature and Nāder’s obsessive, greedy, and murderous nature, they 
also present solutions to marital issues that fit the dominant Islamic narrative, that 
divorce is not an acceptable solution. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Without knowing the intentions of the directors for including these 
subjects into their films, what then are we to learn about Iranian society through 
these films? When we place these films into their proper historical and political 
context, we can begin to draw out some potential significance. 
 The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) halted, and 
indeed reversed, many of the advancements that women’s movements had 
achieved in terms of equal rights and participation in Iranian society during the 
Pahlavi era. In addition, Iran’s conflict with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq (1980-1988) 
resulted in many Iranian films concerned with nationalism and patriotism that 
aimed to entice Iranians to join the battle on the front lines. After this period of 
time, movies whose plots revolve around marriage increase significantly, as will 
also be discussed in the next chapter. 
 In the films included in this chapter, one glaring similarity stands out: 
Both wives have significantly higher social standing and financial status before 
marriage to either Hamīd or Nāder. One would think that this would give her 
more power in the marriage, but as we can see, both are at the mercy of their 
husbands – Mashīd in respects to Hamīd who won’t grant her a divorce, and Āfaq 
in her passive role as her husband actively pursues another wife. In Āfaq’s case, 
she screams at Nāder to leave “her” house when she is angry. While Nāder does 
leave, according to the marriage contract the house is legally his. Perhaps this is 
why Āfaq never pushes for divorce despite the fact that she is unhappy as well, 
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because if she does divorce, she has no right to the property she owned before 
marriage.   
 In addition, the inability of either woman to control their marriages is 
apparent and reflects the current Iranian marital laws that place the majority of 
control into the hands of the man. Mashīd, while seeming to have the proper 
reasons for divorce, never produces the evidence. Metaphorically, this could 
signify that despite the ‘real’ evidence, it is still an uphill batter for women to gain 
divorce from their husbands. In fact, Ziba Mir-Hosseini writes that of the 1735 
divorce cases filed in 1987, 76% named women were the petitioners of divorce. 
Of those 1314 cases filed by women, the courts only accepted 524. The rest were 
either “dismissed” and “rejected” by the courts, or “withdrawn” and “abandoned” 
by the women.154 In both cases, women’s inequality in marriage is apparent. 
 These films then, reflect the inequality women face codified in Iranian law 
even though neither film is classified as fīlmhā-ye zanān. Outside of this genre 
and in the realm of popular cinema, these films reached a broader audience and as 
evidenced by the Iranian periodical film, sparked public discourse about these 
issues in similar fashion to the women’s movements in the Pahlavi period. 
Whether or not it was the director’s intent to showcase this aspect of Iranian law, 
it is subconsciously in each film, driving much of each respective plot through the 
metaphorical platform of marriage that enables this discourse of women’s rights 
to continue 
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Chapter 3:  Marriage in Cinema After Reform 
 Many scholars have argued that Khatami’s tenure as Minister of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance and subsequent presidency signified the height of political reform in 
Iran in allowing for more creative freedom and agency.155 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, these reforms did affect the extent to which directors could use their creative 
freedom and yet it is clear to see the dominant narrative discourse that remains prevalent 
throughout them as exemplified by the acceptable conclusions that the films reach that 
sparked discussion in non-political periodicals about the ways these films handled the 
reality of marriage. This chapter then, aims to discover the ways that films after 
Khatami’s resignation from the Culture of Islamic Guidance and election as president 
used marriage in film to spark societal discussions with regards to the social issues at this 
time that impacted women in their marriages. In doing so, I argue that films during 
Khatami’s presidency were able to more openly discuss these issues as well as present 
solutions and outcomes that went against the dominant cultural Islamic narrative than 
were films during his more radical reforms as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
due to the solidification of support for these reforms in society and the contributions of 
Cinema Deputy Seyfollah Dad. 
CINEMA DURING KHATAMI’S PRESIDENCY  
 Although Khatami’s tenure as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance saw an 
explosion in creative freedom on film with the less strict production regulations, it also 
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saw Khatami’s resignation due to this same freedom that Iranian society did not fully 
accept. When Makhmalbaf’s Nāobt-e Āsheqī/Time of Love (1990) made it through the 
screening process of the MCIG and on the screen, Khatami was forced to defend the 
MCIG’s decisions and his as the minister.156 Time of Love was not only seen as 
transgressing rules of modesty, it goes against Islamic morality.  In this film, the story a 
woman’s affair repeats itself three times but with a different ending each time. While the 
first two end in complete tragedy with deaths of the woman and either her lover or 
husband, the third ends happily as the husband plans the lovers wedding after recognizing 
their true love in and doing so, she escapes judgment for her sins.157 The release of this 
film caused uproar in Iranian society due to its affront to Islamic values and made the 
continuation of his term as minster nearly impossible, and he resigned the same year. 
Although not disappearing entirely, he moved to a position further from the public eye as 
head of the National Library.158 Scholars argue that the reformist ideals that Khatami’s 
had begun to articulate during his second tenure as minister at the MCIG continued to 
formulate and solidify for almost 15 years before they resurfaced again when he entered 
as a candidate for the presidency of Iran.159 
 When Khatami ran for president in 1997, he had the support of the majority of 
filmmakers who had seen him fight for more favorable regulations and practices in the 
film industry. Some of these filmmakers are reported to have made campaign videos 
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supporting Khatami without taking credit as the producers.160 As a proponent Civil 
Society (jām‘eh-ye madanī), Khatami aimed to reconcile western and modernist formulas 
with the official Islamicate values and governance in Iran.161 These secular concepts of 
civil society included pluralism and transparency of politics, women’s public presence in 
society, individual rights, and acceptance of opposing views.162 In an interview with the 
prominent women’s magazine Zanān before the elections took place, Khatami was asked 
to define his position on women’s rights. In contrast to his leading rival, ‘Ali Akbar 
Nateq-Nuri, who declined to answer, Khatami’s frank but pleasant answers further 
solidified him as the only candidate to respect women.163 The addition of women to his 
already overwhelming support lead Khatami to a landslide victory, winning the election 
in 1997 by 70% majority vote and solidifying the changes Khatami had made to the film 
industry in earlier years. Without Khatami’s cinematic guidance, however, the aesthetics 
of cinema changed. 
 When Seyfollah Dad became the Cinema Deputy following Khatami, he 
abolished the previous rating system in favor of statistics. In using statistics he aimed to 
asses what types of narratives were popular with Iranian audiences for allocating 
resources rather than favoring films that followed the dominant cultural practices or films 
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who’s creativity pushed boundaries, as had the systems before this.164 In an interview 
with Sayeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, Dad said: 
We would give the filmmakers statistical information regarding the 
number of the educated, the youth, etc. I was explaining to them that the 
Iranian cinema means the middle class. [. . .] At the moment we have two 
million university students. I told them that these students read books, 
watch Iranian and foreign films. They are interested in politics and follow 
the social ills. I was saying, “these are your customers.”165 
 
Along with the changing the rating system, Dad also continued Khatami’s work of easing 
censorship regulations. Dad also aimed to create legal guidelines that would prevent 
filmmakers from having to rely on the current Cinema Deputy; however, filmmakers 
opposed this claiming they would rather negotiate with ministers than the judiciary that 
could lead to jail if negotiations went south.166 
 It is interesting that at this time the Ministry of Culture of Islamic introduced a 
new film category, sīnemā-ye moslehāneh (‘cinema of reform’), rather than creating this 
category under Khatami.167 Films in this category are considered reformative in nature 
through the way they portray social, cultural and political problems in society. The 
emphasis on women’s inclusion at this time gave rise to many films that criticized current 
legal practices that more often unequally affected women such as Killing Rabids ( Dir. 
Bahram Beyzai, 2001),  The Fifth Reaction (Dir. Tahmine Milani, 2004), The Day I 
Became a Woman (Dir. Marzieh Makhmalbalf, 2000), and The Circle (Dir. Jafar Panahi, 
2000). Here, Dariush Mehrju’i again makes an appearance and true to form, his film 
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Leilā (1997) critically analyzes the current situation of marriage in Iran, in particular, the 
practice of taking a co-wife due to infertility. 
INFERTILITY: WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? 
 Leilā tells the tale of infertility and its effect on each partner as well as the 
marriage relationship as a whole in a way that reveals the emotional destruction that 
taking a co-wife can cause. While this film critiques practices such as these, the 
conclusion approves of actions that fall outside of the dominant Islamic narrative. 
 The story begins retroactively, as Leilā (Leila Hatami, who also starred in A 
Separation) narrates the beginning of her relationship with Rezā (Ali Mossafa). Preparing 
for a celebration, Leilā and her family are shown cooking a pot of sholeh zard168 when 
Rezā, a friend of Leilā’s brother, arrives at her house. After a few furtive glances from 
the two in the backyard, Leilā narrates that this is the first time that she has met him. The 
scene then cuts to a still shot of a somber Leilā facing the camera, half obscured by 
shadow, caste in red, unmoving. In a sad and monotonous tone, she continues to narrate, 
“I married Rezā in the same year. A couple of months later on my birthday, I realized I 
couldn’t get pregnant.”169 
 The visual elements of the scene in combination with Leilā’s delivery 
suggest to the audience the seriousness of this film. The red hue carries into the 
next scene in the form of a red tablecloth that fills the entire frame until the 
camera pans out and brings us into the dining room of a married Rezā and Leilā, 
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and into the present. From here, Leilā’s narration becomes less retroactive but 
rather describes her feelings during impactful moments throughout the film in the 
present tense, as if talking to the audience as they watch these events in her life 
unfold. Through several thoughtful scenes, Mehrju’i emphasizes the fondness of 
the couple for each other during the first few months of their marriage, despite the 
lack of physical touch between the two. In these first few months, two interactions 
take place that present the importance of fertility, one overt and one subtle.  
 On her birthday, Leilā and Rezā first visit his family where they hold a 
small birthday celebration. After Rezā’s father gives Leilā a small ring, his mother 
also gives her a gift and after the normal pleasantries are exchanged between the 
two, Rezā’s mother (Jamileh Sheikhi) is the first to hint at the importance of a 
male heir to the family. She says, “Hopefully next year at the same time we’ll 
have a huge party right hear with your beautiful little boy. We’ll invite your 
mother and your brothers as well; we’ll see each other here.” 
 This scene acts in two very important ways. First, it firmly plants the 
significance of lineage at the center of this family, as the second instance that 
childbearing has been directly addressed in the first ten minutes of the film. 
Secondly, this scene opens up involvement between the audience and other 
characters in the film, suggesting that the audience acts as more of a participant in 
these events rather than an objective spectator or as merely receiving Leilā’s 
perspective of events. After Rezā’s mother says the above lines to Leilā, she turns 
to the audience via direct view into the camera and says, “I can’t tell you how 
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much I want to see Rezā’s boy.” Rezā’s sister also addresses the camera directly 
after she gives Leilā a teapot, commenting that Rezā really loves his tea.  
 The next scene, which occurs in the home of Leilā’s family, produces the 
same message but requires more interpretation. After several of Leilā’s family 
members have given her gifts, Leilā’s uncle gives her a birdcage with two 
lovebirds after which her brother gives her a bird’s egg, “from all the pigeons and 
canaries.” The camera zooms in on Leilā’s hand as her brother, Hussein, gently 
places the egg in her upturned palm. The camera lingers for a moment on her 
hand, before she tenderly closes her fingers around the egg, and draws it to 
herself. This symbolic gesture reinforces Leilā’s desire to have a child.  
 However, despite the strong desire for a child, a visit to the doctor 
confirms that there a problem exists although at this time it is not made clear if the 
problem lies with Rezā or Leilā. During the car ride home, Leilā and Rezā express 
to the other that they are both happy with their lives how they are, with or without 
a child, and regardless of which of them is infertile, no love will be lost between 
them. This scene shows the beginning of one issue that Mehrju’i raises: that is, 
what does it mean to truly love someone? 
 At the second doctor visit, Leilā finds that she is unable to conceive due to 
low hormone levels, something that the doctor suggests seeking medical treatment 
for. But after several months of trying without success, Rezā’s mother finally 
steps in. She explains to Leilā that although Rezā has emphatically stated that he 
doesn’t care about having children, that he only says it for her sake and that as the 
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only male in the family, it would be selfish of Leilā to expect Rezā to not have 
children for the sake of their marriage. Out of love for Rezā, his mother asks Leilā 
to agree to this arrangement. Although unpalatable judging by look on Leilā’s 
face, she agrees to let Rezā’s mother find him a second wife, one that can bear 
him a son. Rezā refuses this idea, as we hear through a conversation between 
Leilā and a friend on the phone, and the couple’s happiness once again resumes. 
A visit from Rezā’s mother is enough to dampen her spirits, and after much 
weeping and begging by her mother-in-law, Leilā agrees to talk to Rezā once 
again about taking another wife. Rezā eventually submits to his wife’s wishes, 
although not happy about it, and the hunt for a second wife begins. 
 One technique that Mehrju’i uses the telephone whose jarring ring often 
signals interference from other family members, particularly Rezā’s mother or 
Aunt Shamsī, that work to threaten the happiness of the couple. A phone call from 
Rezā’s mother interrupts the couple as they come home from the initial doctor 
visit. Already upset by the news, Leilā’s devastation doubles as her mother-in-law 
emphatically suggests that the problem must lie with Leilā, as Rezā’s family has 
no history of infertility. While this phone call places the blame on Leilā, it also 
puts her in a situation where she is seemingly the only one who can offer a 
solution: allowing a second wife. During the search for a second wife, the rings of 
the telephone often interrupt the only happy moments that Leilā and Rezā are able 
to make for themselves in their situation.  
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 The duration of the film shows Leilā slowly falling apart, torn between her 
love for Rezā, and what she feels are the familial and societal expectations of her 
mother-in-law. Rezā doesn’t fare much better himself, feeling the closeness 
fading between himself and his wife while at the same time forced into a second 
marriage, supposedly one that will save the first. Eventually Rezā’s mother and 
aunt find a second wife. Although Leilā had believed she was emotionally strong 
enough and that her love for Rezā was strong enough to welcome another woman 
into her home, she cannot bear it and leaves the same night Rezā brings his 
second wife home from their wedding ceremony. Despite Rezā’s pleading the 
next day, and insistence that nothing has happened – meaning that the 
consummation of the marriage didn’t occur – and that he will gladly divorce his 
second wife, Leilā is heartbroken and remains silent, choosing to stay at her 
family’s house rather than return with Rezā. 
 At this point, the story flashes forward and we learn that Rezā’s second 
wife does become pregnant, but with a girl, Bārān. The next scene cuts to Rezā’s 
mother who weeps over the fact that there is still no son, and the problem has not 
been solved. Eventually, due to lack of love in the marriage, Rezā agrees to 
divorce his second wife who quickly remarries. The end of the film finds Leilā 
and Rezā still separated, but comes full circle when Rezā shows up to Leilā’s 
family house as they once again make sholeh zard, hoping to rekindle their flame 
the same way it had started. He has Bārān in tow, who appears to be three or four 
years old. Leilā watches from the window and smiles. She narrates that maybe 
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one day she will tell Rezā’s daughter this story, and maybe even laugh to tell that 
but for her mother-in-laws interference, Bārān would not have been born.  
 The ending leaves much to be imagined by the audience, especially her 
reference to Bārān as “Rezā’s” daughter, and not their own. Earlier in the 
sequence, Leilā had also narrated that Rezā would not give her a divorce, despite 
the fact that she would not come home. For the more optimistic viewers, Leilā’s 
smile and hint of future interaction with Bārān suggests that some happy ending is 
in store for them. 
 The issues that Mehrju’i raises in this film speak to the effects of 
infertility on marriage, and his technique of including the audience invites them to 
take part in assessing this situation. Namely, who chooses how a couple is happy 
in their marriage? The couple? Their families? Society? If the couple decided to 
not have children, they may be faced with constant pressure from family members 
to seek other avenues, especially if the problem lies with the wife. According to 
Islam, the primary reason for marriage is the gratification of sexual needs and 
procreation. The Iranian civil code allows the husband to have four marriages 
simultaneously,170 so in the case of infertility of the woman, as with Leilā, the 
husband is within his legal rights to seek another wife, one that will be able to 
produce offspring. In the case of a co-wife, the first wife has a right to be treated 
equitably. While we see the completely legal and accepted practice of taking a co-
wife in Leilā, we also see the emotionally devastating toll that it can take on both 
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partners in the marriage. In this way, Leilā is a critique of this practice, or at least 
of the outside pressure, either of familial or societal, on infertile couples, pressure 
that can ruin an otherwise happy marriage. 
 What is interesting about the dossier published on Leilā in 1998 in Fīlm is 
that the author, Jahanbaksh Nouraei, places a lot of blame for the couples demise 
on the mother in law.171 According to Fatima Mernissi, the mother in law is one 
of the “strongest obstacles to conjugal intimacy” in traditional Iranian marriages 
specifically because of the strong relationship between mother and son.172 She 
writes that psychoanalytic theory suggests that men form their ability to handle 
heterosexual relationships by their relationship with their mothers, who then 
continue to be a strong presence in the son’s marriage. However, it seems to be 
Leilā who is imposed upon by her mother-in-law although it is true that Rezā does 
not entirely stand up to her in the film even though he tells Leilā that he doesn’t 
care what they think. The article continues to say that had it not been for the 
intervention by his mother, and after her sister (his maternal aunt), the Leilā and 
Rezā would likely not have pursued a co-wife. Yet with the instigation of the 
mother-in-law and continued persistence – or begging, in some cases – the couple 
eventually approves of a co-wife and slowly the marriage deteriorates. 
 That the article places the blame on the mother-in-law instead of Rezā as 
the husband of the family indicates that the women in this film have the 
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responsibility for controlling the marriage. First, when Leilā ‘disrupts’ the family 
by her infertility and second, when the mother-in-law ‘fixes’ this problem. While 
this may place some control within the hands of women, it also goes against the 
dominant cultural narrative when Leilā, leaves her husband and returns to live 
with her family. That the co-wife also seeks divorce is significant because the film 
does not provide a legal reason as with Mashīd in Hāmoun. The ending of the 
film, in failing to show if the Leilā and Rezā reconcile, also enforces the idea that 
this film goes against the dominant narrative. 
 As seen in  Hāmoun, Āsheghāneh/Romantic and Leilā, marriage has often 
been imbued with a special significance in Iran, frequently representing the 
feminized relationship between Iran and her citizens. As such, marriage has often 
been a sight in which the state is able to exert much of its influence. This is also 
the case in literature, including film, where marriage can be defined by state 
ideology and yet it also works as a platform for Iranian citizens to discuss social 
reform.173 The Pahlavi era (1925–1978) is known as a period of modernization 
while the Islamic Revolution (1979) brought traditional Islamic values back to 
Iran. The Reformist era of Khatami (1997–2005) represents a clash of these 
ideals. The film Ātash Bas/Ceasefire, directed by Tahmineh Milani in 2006, 
draws attention to this clashing and reconciliation of tradition and modernity in 
Iranian society and is embodied through the marriage of modern Sāyeh (Mahnaz 
Afshar) and her traditional suitor, Yousef (Mohammad Reza Golzar). 
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TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN MARRIAGE 
 We enter into this film with an already married Sāyeh and Yousef. 
However not all is well with their marriage. After mistakenly walking into a 
psychiatrist’s office rather than the office of a divorce lawyer, the therapist 
convinces Sāyeh that he may be able to help her with her marital problems. This 
begins a series of flashback narratives describing how the couple met and fell in 
love, as well as the problems they faced in married life.  
 A very modern and spunky Sāyeh, working as an overseer, catches the eye 
of Youssef, an engineer. They meet frequently on job sites were they always seem 
to be playing mischievous pranks on each other, such as Sāyeh dumping what 
looks like un-mixed concrete powder on an unsuspected Yousef on the floor 
below. Two weeks later and on another site, Yousef retaliates by scooping Sāyeh 
in a wheelbarrow and dumping her into a pile of dirt. Several months later, the 
couple go to on a date where Yousef teasingly asks her about what she desires in a 
marriage partner. She responds that she would like someone like herself, an 
intellectual, stylish, generous, kind and beautiful. After Yousef jokingly leaves the 
table after saying that he does not fit those qualities, he turns back and says that 
he only has one thing to add, that he doesn’t like her clothes. She says he’ll get 
used to it. They are married in the next scene. From this point audiences can see 
the clash of modernity and tradition in the form of childish games between the 
two as they take every opportunity to settle the score with each other.  
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 Although Yousef had seemed to fall in love with Sāyeh as she was, when 
they are married he demands that she not wear the same clothes as she had before 
– that is, semi-forming fitting clothes and pants. When she refuses he challenges 
her, saying that he will count to five and give her time to change her mind. He 
begins to count, “1…2…3…4…4 ½…4 ¾…” when Sāyeh interrupts him with 
“5.” After calling a “ceasefire” on their glass breaking fight in the living room, 
Sāyeh walks into the closet to see Yousef on the floor cutting up all of her clothes 
that he thinks are inappropriate. The next scene shows Sāyeh cutting the lock on 
Yousef’s closet – something he had undoubtedly secured there to prevent 
retaliation – and after, giving away all of Yousef’s suits to random men gathered 
in their front yard.  
 In another scene, Youssef announces that he’d rather have Sāyeh not 
work, and be like his mother, a stay at home wife who cooks for him. When 
Yousef invited his family over for dinner, Sāyeh goes to great lengths to prepare a 
wonderful feast for them. Oddly enough, despite the fact that Yousef would prefer 
Sāyeh to play in this role, he decides to sabotage her food, sprinkling copious 
amounts of salt all over everything when no one is looking. However, Sāyeh has 
anticipated this move and before she brings the food out of the kitchen, she 
replaces it all with identical dishes she has hidden in various locations around the 
kitchen. Yousef is shocked when his family praises her for her cooking. In 
retaliation, Sāyeh 
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 has painted fake bruises on herself to convince her mother-in-law that Yousef has 
hit her, causing him to be reprimanded publicly at the dinner table by his mother. 
 After many similar flashback scenes, in between which Sāyeh and the 
therapist discuss these events, Yousef finally finds Sāyeh in the psychiatrist’s 
office. The therapist once again convinces the couple to let him help them, saying 
that he feels that they only have a communication problem. He recommends that 
they live apart for a week in order to decide if they would really like to work on 
their relationship. In one week they both decide to forgo the divorce and try to fix 
their marriage. From here, the therapist works with both Sāyeh and Yousef on 
their communication skills.  
 He believes that emotional health begins with embracing your inner-child, 
not being controlled by it, which speaks to the new forms of spirituality 
flourishing in Iran during this time.174 During these sessions, elements of Iranian 
society begin to emerge. Yousef admits that while he is drawn to an educated and 
financially independent woman, he does not desire these qualities in his own wife, 
and that Sāyeh embodies the opposite of what he desires in an ideal wife. Sāyeh 
also admits to inner issues that affect her marriage, namely that she always knew 
her father desired a son. Because of this, she takes some joy in humiliating Yousef 
publicly. Sāyeh retreats to the Caspian see for vacation as Yousef dutifully spends 
ten days trying to reach his inner-child. After this period of time, the couple is 
able to come together and reconcile their differences, suggesting that modernity 
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and tradition can exist side by harmoniously if the people of Iranian are willing to 
communicate and understand the needs of each other.  
 Milani’s emphasis on tradition and modernity, shown through the unmet 
needs of both Sāyeh and Yousef, speaks to one important solution: 
communication. By focusing on listening to the inner-child, and learning to 
understand what is needed for one to be happy also lends itself to learning when 
and how to make sacrifices for the needs of others. Authors who have analyzed 
this film claim that the focus on the inner child speaks to issues concerning the 
segregation of sexes at an early age, and how that can manifest into problems of 
communication later on in marriage.175 Whether or not this is the intended 
message of Milani, one can guess that she believes that the onus for change lays 
with the men in Iranian society.  
 According to Fīlm magazine, Ātash Bas uses humor and jokes to criticize 
women’s rights in Iranian’s patriarchal society.176 While this could be seen, then, 
as a women’s film, it’s important to not that none of her previous films are 
classified as such, and neither is this. Why then this sudden interest with women’s 
issues? Journalists attribute this to the death of her husband, who previously had 
much control over the content of her films and prevented her from giving 
attention to specific societal issues in her film. While not formally classified as a 
women’s film, it is important to note that Fīlm attributes the production of this 
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film with the transformation of Milani as a director who crossed generic 
boundaries from purely comedic films. “With such ability and history of success, 
Milani escapes humor in creating a satirical film.”177 to satirical films.178 Whether 
the change in genre helped Milani to reach new audiences that may have shied 
way form purely comedic films or not, critics have called Ātash Bas Milani’s 
most successful film. Ticket sales for Ātash Bas climbed to almost 175 thousand 
U.S. dollars in its first month in the box office,179 and critics expected it to be the 
one of the most successful Iranian films of the year.180  Indeed, many women 
specifically wanted to see this movie again and again, sometimes up to five times 
in theaters.181  The volume of ticket sales and discussion in Fīlm shows that the 
themes in this film resonated especially with women in Iranian society and that 
Ātash Bas was able to discuss women’s issues although it is not classified as a 
fīlmhā-ye zanān. 
CONCLUSION 
 As has been demonstrated, marriage in Iran is a particularly contentious 
topic, one that has made its way into various forms of societal discourse, from a 
religious duty presented in the Qur’an to sites of contestation in Iranian film. The 
reformist policies of Khatami have not solely allowed for films to become these 
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sites of contestation although they have undoubtedly allowed more freedom in the 
discussion of marital issues in film in combination with reforms made by 
Seyfollah Dad who became Cinema Deputy following Khatami. Analyzing 
media, like literature, is key to understanding how these negotiations take place in 
society. 
 Citizen consumers “also demand the right to participate – to be an part of 
the production, circulation, and interpretation of their culture and to exert a 
shaping role over the content of the popular culture that is such a formative 
influence and vital resource within their lives.”182 Due to the literary history in 
Iran that often plays with layers of meaning in a single text has a certain effect on 
Iranians, one that makes them uniquely predisposed to interpret literature and look 
for hidden meanings.183 Looking at the popularity of films among Iranians sheds 
light on the issues that these citizen consumers consider important, ones that they 
are willing to engage with on the cinematic screen. 
 These films are different than the films in the previous chapter as women 
are seen to take a more active role in their marriage. In the previous films, Mashīd 
and Āfaq should have more control in their marriages due to their financial and 
social status before marriage and yet they are unable to obtain divorce – in  
Mashīd’s case – or exist in a happy marriage – as in the case of Āfaq. However 
                                                
182 Natin Govil, “Thinking Nationally: Domicile, Distinction, and Dysfunction in Global Media 
Exchange,” Media Industries: History, Theory and Method. Edited by Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren 
(Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 135. 
183 Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad, The Politics of Iranian Cinema. 
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Leilā and Sāyeh are shown to be able to make more decisions with regards to their 
marriage, although the ending is not always happy as we see in Leilā. That 
women’s agency increases between these two periods of reform indicates that the 
public responded better to these types of films because of the instillation of the 
statistics rating system. Also, that films focus on these prevalent societal issues 
and that the articles places the problem and solution in the hands of women Is 
indicative of a continued women’s rights discourse in films that are not classified 
as fīlmhā-ye zanān 
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Conclusion 
 Many governments have often used cinema as a political tool, and this is no 
different in Iran. But while cinema may reflect political values and messages via 
government censorship laws and guidelines for films, filmmakers, producers, actors and 
many others in the cinema industry have used cinema as a sight of contestation, 
negotiation and resistance towards the dominant ideologies.  
 Women’s issues that began during the Constitutional Revolution found fertile 
breeding ground under the Pahlavi regime due to its modernistic political and cultural 
agenda that often times directly aligned with the aims of these movements. During this 
time and up until the Revolution, the Qajar and Pahlavi Dynasties granted women the 
right to vote, the right to participate in the workforce and politics, and the right to receive 
an education. In addition, women benefited greatly from many changes to the Iranian 
Civil Code that improved their positions in society dramatically. As an important aspect 
of Islamic society, marriage acted as a physical site in which many of these legal changes 
took place, such as raising the marital age for women, granting women the right to 
divorce her husband under appropriate circumstances, taking the extra-judicial right from 
divorce away from men, and giving women rights in child custody. In addition to legal 
changes, marriage also played an important role in film in Pahlavi cinema in structuring 
Iranian society. 
 In film, marriage acted as a platform through with political values and ideologies 
were and communicated. In many of the films discussed in chapter one, marriage erased 
less than desirable qualities in men – read: Iranian society – such as vigilantism and 
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changed the men into respectable members of society because of their abilities to get and 
maintain wives. In this way, marriage acted as a physical site in film for the metaphorical 
reform of Iranian society. The political nature of film at this time due to the government 
censorship created a forum for women’s issues to be discussed via the same metaphorical 
platform after the Islamic Revolution when women’s movements were halted. 
 During the Revolution, women believed that the new government would reward 
their participation in ant-Shah demonstrations and movements with more open inclusion 
in society, but this was not the case. Although women symbolically occupied a very 
important role in nationalization projects, the government heavily regulated their 
participation in society, and their arena outside of domesticity decreased significantly 
from their previous situation in the Pahlavi Dynasty. During this time, regulations of film 
intensified as well, making it increasingly difficult to criticize or raise issues that the new 
Islamic Republic of Iran disapproved of, such as women’s rights. Still, these issues found 
a way into Iranian cinema due to the imbedded nature of marriage in Iran, the inability of 
women’s movements to mobilize on the ground, and the space that cinema created for 
discussion and resistance via the metaphorical platform of marriage. 
 While a content analysis of each film, Āsheghāneh and Hāmoun, can easily be 
linked to specific Iranian laws that could influence the story, it is the discussions found 
the in Iranian periodical Fīlm that ground each film in societal discourse related to 
women’s issues especially because Fīlm is not commonly thought of as a political 
periodical. That each article, in both their analyses and criticisms, connects each film to a 
particular societal issue indicates that Iranians, similar to what Zeydabadi-Nejad 
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proposes, have a proclivity to decipher hidden messages in film. In this way, films that 
are outside of the fīlmhā-ye zanān genre, and are not generally classified as activist films, 
take an active role in enabling discussing of these issues. As this chapter has discussed, 
ignoring films outside of these genres would be to ignore films that have been successful 
in raising consciousness around these debates when women’s movements were less open 
and active, and until regulations changed under President Mohammad Khatami. 
 The reform policies of Khatami in society and in the film industry allowed for 
more open discussion of social problems. While films projects had previously received 
government funding based on their educational and political values, Khatami along with 
the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and the Farabi Cinema Foundation 
established a new rating system that promoted creativity. However it was the reforms of 
Seyfollah Dad that contributed to the genre sīnemā-ye moslehāneh that saw more open 
discussion of social, political and cultural problems.  The films discussed from this 
period, Ātash Bas and Leilā, discuss issues more clearly, like the practice of having a 
second wife in cases of infertility in Leilā. However, these issues take on a more balanced 
view of how these issues affect wives as well as husbands, in comparison to the films 
discussed in the previous chapter that situate the protagonist as male as the victor while 
presenting more acceptable endings in the dominant Islamic narrative.  
 Placing each film in its historical context with relation to changes in the film 
industry, such as cinema regulations from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 
show how these films were able to use marriage as a metaphorical platform for discussing 
issues related to women’s rights. The articles found in Fīlm first demonstrates that 
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Iranians actively participated in making meaning of these films and second, that these 
films raised social consciousness when the government regulated activism. As a political 
tool, then, cinema in Iran has found a way to transgress government control in order to 
reflect the real concerns of Iranian society through the metaphorical site of marriage 
because it is embedded in Iranian society.   
 This thesis has attempted to place these films dealing with marital issues in the 
context of the film industry as well as the discussions and laws with relation to marriage. 
Without conducting interviews with the filmmakers themselves, it is impossible to 
determine exactly what their intentions were when creating their films, but it is possible 
to see the hints pointing that critique contemporary Iranian society and legal and social 
issues pertaining to women. There are many avenues not explored in this paper, one of 
those being the emphasis placed on motherhood in women’s roles in Iranian society and 
how that manifests in Iranian cinema. Exploring this issue further would add to 
understanding women’s roles in Iranian society, both past and present.  
 Most importantly, however, this thesis has demonstrated that we should conceive 
of films outside of their prescribed generic form in order to gain valuable insight into 
societies from films whose aims may not be to give these critiques and praises. What 
might be we learn about serious issue in society, say, from a film classified as comedy? 
When we begin to do open generic conventions, at least for the purposes of film analysis, 
we open up our understanding to the nuanced, subtle and often subconscious comments 
that these films make about particular practices and aspects of life.  
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Translation 
 Many of the spellings of Persian words used in this paper have come directly from 
other authors and sources, and those spellings have remained intact. For the spelling of 
the other Persian words included in this thesis, I have used the Iranian Studies translation 
scheme to the best of my abilities. 
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